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GOING NOWHERE "FAST" (OR "FURIOUS"): THE
NONEXISTENT U.S. FIREARMS TRAFFICKING STATUTE
AND THE RISE OF MEXICAN DRUG CARTEL VIOLENCE
Stewart M. Young*
Drug trafficking violence in Mexico, now reaching epidemic proportions, greatly
impacts both the Mexican and United States governments. Despite the escalation of
the "War on Drugs, " drug trafficking from Mexico to the United States continues
largely unabated, stifling tourism revenue and lawful economic opportunities, and
causing violence previously unknown in Mexico. Thus far, the United States' ef-
forts to deal with this drug trafficking and violence include the recent debacle of
Operation Fast and Furious. News regarding this Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives'(A TF) operation shocked citizens and lawmakers alike, as
Fast and Furious allowed firearms to "walk" down to Mexico unimpeded in a
futile attempt to identify firearms traffickers in Mexican drug cartels. Ultimately,
this operation led to the presence of over two thousand additional firearms in Mex-
ico, contributing to continued violence south of the U.S. border and the possibility
of spillover violence back into the United States. An analysis of Operation Fast and
Furious and other law enforcement attempts to stop firearms trafficking and drug
cartel violence in Mexico demonstrates that the development and tactics of these
operations require a more comprehensive approach to the problems facing Mexico
and the United States.
This Article discusses extraterritoriality, and the effects of U.S. domestic criminal
laws on aforeign country, in the context of U.S. domestic firearms trafficking laws.
First, this Article lays out the problem: Mexican drug cartels are receiving
thousands of weapons from the United States with which to create havoc and wreak
violence upon both nations. It then discusses the dynamics of that problem, which
include addressing the current legal framework and the NRA lobbying effort
against restrictions on firearms. The Article examines the A TF's Project Gunrunner
and Operation Fast and Furious and argues that the lack of a simple and strong
firearms trafficking statute contributed to A T's decision to implement Operation
Fast and Furious, thereby contributing to large numbers of firearms heading south
to Mexico. The Article further argues that without a true comprehensive firearms
trafficking statute, the combined efforts of the United States and Mexico to stem the
southbound flow of firearms and resulting drug violence will ultimately fail. Be-
sides seeking to contribute to the dialogue on solving a looming and important
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problem, this Article endeavors to promote discussion about the extraterritorial ef-
fects of U.S. domestic criminal laws. Ultimately, it argues that, in certain contexts,
the positive extraterritorial effects of such laws should take priority over complaints
about their negligible domestic effects.
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"[It] is simply too easy to say the problem is over there .... I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four years, drug-related killings in Mexico have
reached alarming proportions. From mid-2006 through September
2011, more than 47,500 people died in drug cartel or gang-related
killings, jumping almost 60 percent in 2010 alone.2 The violence's
ferocity continued throughout 2011; statistics now indicate that
over 55,000 lives were claimed by drug violence.5 Since the 2006
1. U.S. Obligations Under the Merida Initiative: Hearing of W Hemisphere Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Aff., I10th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Hon. Eliot L. Engel), available at
http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/40659.pdf [hereinafter "U.S. Obligations"]. The full quote
states that "[it] is simply too easy to say the problem is over there and that we can just send
some money and helicopters to a few foreign countries and keep the narcotrafficking
scourge outside our borders." Id.
2. Mark Stevenson, Mexico: 34,612 Drug War Deaths; 15,273 in 2010, THE HuFFINGTON
PosT (Jan. 12, 2011, 9:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/12/mexico-drug-
war-deaths-2010_n_808277.html; see also 157 CONG. REc. E1338-39 (daily ed. July 15, 2011)
(statement by Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-
2011-07-15/html/CREC-2011-07-15-ptl-PgE1338-5.htm; Bruce Zagaris, Federal Indictment
Against 17 Persons for Trafficking Firearms to Mexican Drug Organizations, 27 INr'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 652, 652 (2011).
3. CIAaRE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RIL32724, MEXICO: ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS 6 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf; Maloney, supra
note 2; see also Mexico Horror: Gunmen Dump 35 Bodies on Avenue, USATODAY, Sept. 21, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-20/drug-war-mexico/50486328/1?loc
=interstitialskip (reporting that on September 20, 2011, suspected gun traffickers drove two
trucks to a main avenue in Boca del Rio during afternoon rush hour traffic and dumped
thirty-five victims into the middle of the street while gunmen stood guard and pointed weap-
ons at motorists. A number of the victims had criminal records for murder, drug dealing,
kidnapping, and extortion).
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election of Mexican President Felipe Calderon, Mexican drug car-
tels4 have engaged in a campaign of terror and gun violence unlike
anything seen in recent memory. Indeed, more than 70 percent of
Mexicans living in Mexico believe that "illegal drugs are a very big
problem in their country and even more (77%) see the violence
associated with drug cartels as a major challenge. '5 And fewer than
half of Mexicans believe that the government is currently making
progress in its fight against the drug cartels. 6
This is not just Mexico's problem. First and foremost, the United
States is the biggest and best customer of Mexican drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) .7 American customers fuel Mexican drug car-
tel profits.8 And the United States generally provides the bulk of the
guns used by the Mexican DTOs.9 Since 2007, the Mexican govern-
ment has confiscated more than one hundred thousand firearms,
and, according to one source, "84% of those guns came from the
United States."'0 An ATF study confirms this observation: in 2009
4. These drug cartels are also known in the literature as "drug trafficking organiza-
tions" or "DTOs."
5. Fewer than Half See Progress in Drug War: Crime and Drug Cartels Top Concerns in Mexico,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/08/31/crime-and-
drug-cartels-top-concerns-in-mexico/.
6. See id. (describing how 45 percent of Mexicans believe that the Mexican government
is making progress against drug cartels, 25 percent believe that it is "about the same," and 29
percent believe the Mexican government is losing ground).
7. According to both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO), since 2006, the "Mexican DTOs and criminal groups and the
most influential drug traffickers are the greatest organizational threat to the United States."
U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFIcE, GAO-09-709, FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: U.S. EFFORTS TO
COMBAT ARMS TRAFFICKING TO MEXICO FACE PLANNING AND COORDINATION CHALLENGES 8
(2009) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09709.pdf, see also NAT'L DRUG INTELLI-
GENCE CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2011-Q0317-001, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 7
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf ("Mexi-
can-based [transnational criminal organizations] and their associates dominate the supply
and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States.").
8. Peter Reuter, How Can Domestic U.S. Drug Policy Help Mexico?, in SHARED RESPONSIBIL.
ITY-. U.S. MEXICO POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRME 121, 122 (Eric L. Ol-
son, David A. Shirk & Andrew Selee eds., 2010) ("Mexico's principal drug problems, the
violence and corruption related to trafficking, are the consequence of the large U.S. market
for cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine. If the U.S. market disappeared, Mex-
ico's problem would diminish dramatically, even with its own domestic consumption remain-
ing."). Estimates of U.S. drug consumption in 2005 include approximately 381 metric tons of
cocaine and 2,947 metric tons of marijuana, primarily shipped from Mexico. Id. at 126.
9. Maloney, supra note 2.
10. Id.; see also VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., INDICTED: TYPES OF FIREARMS AND METHODS OF GUN
TRAFFICKING FROM THE UNITED STATES TO MEXICO AS REVEALED IN U.S. COURT DOCUMENTS 1,
6 (2009), available at http://wvw.vpc.org/studies/indicted.pdf (analyzing indictments and
informations filed in federal district courts in border districts from February 2006 through
February 2009, finding that these indicted individuals are alleged to be responsible for traf-
ficking approximately 1,700 firearms to Mexico, and demonstrating that, based on limited
data, 63 percent of the firearms recovered before entering Mexico were either assault (rifle)
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and 2010, 70 percent of the firearms recovered by the Mexican gov-
ernment (and that the Mexican government submitted for trace)
were either manufactured in the United States or were first im-
ported to the United States before being transported to Mexico."1
Transnational gangs, such as MS-13 and 18th Street, build the drug
cartel arsenal by serving as conduits for trafficking guns south to
Mexico. 12 In short, the United States funds and arms the Mexican
drug cartels. The clear implication of arming drug cartels south of
the United States is not just that violence will continue south of the
U.S. border, but also that the violence has spilled and will continue
to spill over the border into the United States.13
What can be done?14 A ban on firearms in the United States will
never be seriously considered, 15 nor, in the current political cli-
mate, will there be a ban on certain types of weapons favored by the
weapons (42 percent), armor-piercing handguns (18 percent), or anti-armor .50 caliber
sniper rifles (2 percent)); GAO, supra note 7, at 15 ("[W]e determined over 20,000, or 87
percent, of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal
year 2008 originated in the United States. Over 90 percent of the firearms seized in Mexico
and traced over the last 3 years have come from the United States.").
11. Maloney, supra note 2; see also Evan Perez, Mexican Guns Tied to U.S.: American-Sourced
Weapons Account for 70% of Seized Firearms in Mexico, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2011, http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304259304576375961350290734.html (showing that
in .2009, of 21,313 firearms recovered in Mexico, 10,945 were manufactured in the United
States and 3,268 were first imported into the United States before ending up in Mexico, with
the origin of 7,100 firearms undetermined; of 7,971 firearms recovered in 2010, 4,186 were
manufactured in the United States and 2,105 were first imported into the United States, with
the origin of 1,680 firearms undetermined); GAO, supra note 7, at 14-16 (noting that from
fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008, approximately 87 percent of the firearms traced by
the ATF, and provided by the Mexican government, originated or were trafficked through
the United States). This Article notes the original claims by U.S. officials of 90 percent of
firearms recovered in Mexico originating in the United States.
12. TOM DIAz, No BOUNDARIES: TRANSNATIONAL LATINO GANGS AND AMERICAN LAw EN-
FORCIMFNT 278 (2009).
13. Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S., N.Y.
TItmES, Mar. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/us/23border.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0; Elizabeth Llorente, Texas Attorney General Says Mexico Drug Violence Spilling
Over, FoxNEws.coM (Nov. 2, 2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/11/
02/texas-attorney-general-says-mexico-cartel-violence-is-spilling-i n to-lone-s tar/.
14. Both "U.S. and Mexican officials [have indicated] that, in the past, the Mexican
government considered illicit arms trafficking a problem that originated in the United States
and thus needed to be dealt with by U.S. authorities." GAO, supra note 7, at 9.
15. Indeed, the power of the National Rifle Association (NRA) is just too great to allow
for a ban on firearms in the United States, as we have seen with the contempt vote against
Eric Holder. Seventeen moderate Democratic House members voted in favor of the con-
tempt charge at the NRA's behest. See Ed O'Keefe, Which Democrats Voted to Hold Eric Holder in
Contempt?, WASH. POST (June 29, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
2chambers/post/whih-democrats-vted-t-hold-eri-holder-in-contempt-of-congress/20 2/
06/28/gQAUKVy9V blog.html?hpid=Z4 (noting specifically that all but one of the seven-
teen received endorsement by the NRA and that the NRA would be tracking this vote to
determine future endorsements).
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drug cartels.' 6 Since 2004, when the Federal Assault Weapons Ban17
(FAWB) expired, it indeed appears that significant numbers of as-
sault-style rifles traveled more easily to Mexico and resulted in in-
creased gun violence.' Meanwhile, the current legal regime for
firearms trafficking prosecution in the United States is limited in
scope and does not provide meaningful deterrence to limit gun
trafficking to Mexico.' 9 Additionally, the lobbying efforts of the Na-
tional Rifle Association (NRA) hamper any real changes proposed
to firearms-related laws in the United States, while the totality of the
political climate further dampens true discussion on meaningful re-
form to firearms trafficking laws.
20
Those are the problems.21 In response, ATF developed and initi-
ated Project Gunrunner and Operation Fast and Furious as hopeful
16. The six firearms generally favored by the DTOs are semiautomatic rifles, including
the AK-47-type or the AR-15-type, and large frame semiautomatic pistols, such as the .38
Super, 9 mm, .45 and the 5.7 mm. See generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREYARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROJECT GUNRUNNER: THE SOUTHWEST BORDER INITIATIVE
(2009), available at http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/af-p-3317-6.pdf.
17. The Federal Assault Weapons Ban was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (30), imple-
mented in 1994, and expired in 2004. SeeJill Lawrence, Federal Ban on Assault Weapons Expires,
USATODAY, Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-12-
weapons-banx.htm.
18. Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube & Omar Garcia-Ponce, Cross-Border Spillover: U.S.
Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico 23-24 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/18622/DubeO3052011.pdf (providing economic data
demonstrating that the FAWB's expiration in 2004 led to a marked increase in gun-related
murders and gun-related prosecutions and seizures from 2004 to 2006 in Mexican municipal-
ities within one hundred miles of the borders of Arizona and Texas); see also Luke Chicoine,
Exporting the Second Amendment: U.S. Assault Weapons and the Homicide Rate in Mexico
22 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://nd.edu/~lchicoin/Chicoine
_AWB_Mexico.pdf (examining statistics for 2004-2008 and finding that the Mexican homi-
cide rate following the expiration of the FAWB increased markedly).
19. OFI-cE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, REVIEW OF ATF's PROJECT GUNRUN-
NER vi (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e101.pdf ("Because
there is no federal firearms trafficking statute, ATF must use a wide variety of other statutes to
combat firearms trafficking. .... USAOs are less likely to accept and prosecute Project
Gunrunner cases.").
20. Despite the statistics provided by the governments of Mexico and the United States,
the NRA "aggressively challenges statistics that show 80 to 90 percent of the weapons seized
in Mexico are first sold in the United States." James Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, As Mexico Drug
Violence Runs Rampant, US. Guns Tied to Crime South of the Border, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-d),n/content/article/2010/12/12/AR2010121202663
,html. As noted by the executive director of the NRA Institute for Legislative Action, "To
suggest that U.S. gun laws are somehow to blame for Mexican drug cartelviolence is a sad
fantasy." Id. Just the fact that the NRA has an "Institute for Legislative Action" demonstrates
the power of the gun lobby, including its ability to employ a staff of eighty and a "team of full-
time lobbyists" to work on gun control issues. See About NRA-ILA, NRA-ILA, http://
www.nraila.org/about-nra-ila.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
21. See also MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFoRM, 112TH CONG.,
FATALLY FLAWED: FIVE YEARS OF GUNWALKING IN ARIZONA 1, 32-43 (2012), available at http://
democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/minority-report_13112.pdf; MINORITY STAFF
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efforts to curb drug violence in Mexico. Unfortunately, these initia-
tives produced disastrous results.22 The ATF- and DOJ-initiated Fast
and Furious allowed government-tracked weapons to travel freely
across the border in order to identify their end-users. While mis-
guided in application and implementation, Fast and Furious was at
least a creative effort by the U.S. government 23 to address the prob-
lem of firearms flowing to Mexico. Although the initiative fell flat
and may have resulted in the death of a U.S. law enforcement of-
ficer, 2 4 it also demonstrated the inadequacies of U.S. firearms traf-
ficking laws in general. Without a true firearms trafficking statute,
ATF agents and federal,, prosecutors cobble together firearms
charges that provide no real bark or bite to deter criminals from
trafficking in firearms. 25 Accordingly, while Operation Fast and Fu-
rious sought to reduce the large-scale trafficking of firearms to Mex-
ican drug cartels from Arizona, the inherent flaws in the current
firearms trafficking laws did not allow agents and prosecutors to
make a true firearms trafficking case.
OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORM, 112TH CONG., OUTGUNNED: LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENTS WARN CONGRESS THEY LACK ADEQUATE TOOLS TO COUNTER ILLEGAL FIREARMS (2011),
available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/OUTGUNNED %20
Firearms%20Trafficking%20Report%20-%2OFinal.pdf.
22. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOVT REFORM, 112TH CONG.,
FATALLY FLAWED: Fvwz YEARS OF GUNWALKING IN ARIZONA 1, 32-43 (2012), available at http://
democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/minority-report_13112.pdf; MINORITY STAFF
oF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 112TH CONG., OUTGUNNED: LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENTrs WARN CONGRESS THEY LACK ADEQUATE TooLS TO COUNTER ILLEGAL FIREARMS (2011),
available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/OUTGUNNED%20
Firearms%20Trafficking%20Report%20-%2OFinal.pdf.
23. One may quibble with whether this was an effort by the "U.S. government" or a small
misguided attempt by ATF agents and Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the District of Arizona.
Indeed, there appears to be a split over who was ultimately responsible for Operation Fast
and Furious. Compare Katherine Eban, The Truth About the Fast and Furious Scandal FORTUNE
(June 27, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/27/fast-and-
furious-truth/ (making the argument that ATF supervisors did not intentionally allow guns to
"walk" down to Mexico, but that the federal prosecutors consistently derailed their efforts to
arrest suspects and initiate prosecution) with JOINT STArS or H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
GOV'T REFORM & S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE'S
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS 28-34, 46-51 (2011) and JOINT
STAFFS OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM AND S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH
CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: FUELING CARTEL VIO-
LENCE 27-39 (2011).
24. SeeJoiNr STAFFS, ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 43-46.
25. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEw OF ATF's OPERATION
FAST AND FURIOUS AND RELATED MATTERS 17 (2012) ("There is no federal statute specifically
prohibiting firearms trafficking or straw purchasing. Instead, these activities are investigated
by agents and charged by prosecutors using a variety of criminal statutes depending on the
circumstances of each particular case."); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at vi (mak-
ing the same points).
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The current statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, criminalizes "dealing in fire-
arms" and generally has a clear domestic focus. It does not criminal-
ize actual firearms trafficking because firearms have a special role
in the American psyche and are not inherently contraband, as op-
posed to illegal drugs.26 Given the events of the past four years, and
the large amount of firearms traffic into Mexico, the current stat-
ute's failings demonstrate a need for change. The current firearms
statutes have a purely domestic focus; 2 7 a more extraterritorial focus
would be beneficial to curb southbound firearms trafficking and
thus curb drug violence in Mexico.
This then begs the question, should the U.S. government be in
the business of passing and enforcing U.S. domestic laws based on
their perceived affect on other countries? If so, how far should the
effort go, particularly in the context of firearms trafficking? This
Article argues that the extraterritorial effects of U.S. domestic crim-
inal laws, particularly in the arena of firearms trafficking, are impor-
tant and must be a strong consideration in the passage of a more
comprehensive federal firearms trafficking statute. It argues that
the implementation of a true firearms trafficking statute, possibly
along the lines of the federal drug trafficking statutes, would allevi-
ate the currently confining structure of firearms prosecutions in the
United States and have a clear and marked effect on drug violence
in Mexico.
Specifically, this Article makes two main arguments. First, it pro-
poses that the extraterritorial effects of U.S. domestic laws should
be considered and should often drive the passage of domestic crim-
inal laws in the United States. Second, the Article urges reconsider-
ing domestic criminal laws in the context of firearms trafficking to
establish a stronger and more robust law, and proposes that the
effect of this law should primarily drive its passage. Within the con-
text of current legal scholarship, the academy often discusses the
extraterritorial effects of domestic laws post-passage. This Article ar-
gues that such effects should clearly be a part of the conversation
before passage, and that-at least in the context of firearms traffick-
ing-the extraterritorial effects should be the driving force for pas-
sage. Passing a true firearms trafficking statute would effectively
curb the rising drug violence in Mexico.
26. Eban, supra note 23 ("The ATF is a bureau of judgment calls. Drug enforcement
agents can confiscate cocaine and arrest anyone in possession of it. But ATF must distinguish
constitutionally protected legal guns from illegal ones, with the NRA and other Second
Amendment activists watching for missteps.").
27. OFFICE OF INSPEcrOR GEN., supra note 25, at 17-19 (identifying the numerous
charges for domestic firearms activities).
[VOL, 46:1
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I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS OF U.S. DOMESTIC LAWS,
ESPECIALLY DOMESTIC CRIMINAL LAW
Numerous academics have addressed the extraterritorial effects
of U.S. domestic laws, especially the detrimental effects of those
laws on the economies of other countries. 28 Scholarship on the
criminal side of this issue generally deals with laws that criminalize
actions by U.S. citizens and companies in foreign countries. 29 Abun-
dant scholarship also exists on the scope of extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. securities laws.30  Overall, discussions about the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law are quite in vogue.31 As
Anthony Colangelo writes,
[w] ith the proliferation of laws seeking aggressively to regulate
foreign conduct, some commentators and courts have started
to engage more foundational questions about the existence
28. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J.
INT'L Bus. STUD. 634 (2008) (demonstrating that companies located in countries with anti-
bribery legislation invest less in countries where bribery is more prevalent); Ellen S. Podgor,
Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 Am. CR[M. L. REV. 325 (1997)
(discussing issues of extraterritorial criminal prosecution); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W.
Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15
DICK. J. INT'L L. 509 (1997) (arguing that Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforce-
ment could be more effective and noting that pre-OECD legislation to curb foreign bribery
was ineffective); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legis-
lation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010) (arguing that
anti-bribery legislation, and specifically the implementation of the FCPA, ultimately deters
U.S. investment in countries that have lax bribery laws and therefore deters investment op-
portunities and further economic growth in emerging markets that are subject to bribery-
based regimes).
29. See, e.g., Anthony Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terror-
ism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121 (2007);
Podgor, supra note 28; Spalding, supra note 28; Brian A. Lichter, Note, The Offences Clause,
Due Process, and the Extraterritorial Reach of Federal Crminal Law in Narco-Terrorism Prosecutions,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1929 (2009).
30. Knu Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the
Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FoRDHAM J. Corn'. & FIN.
L. 89 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud
Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 241 (1992);
Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule lOb-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28
COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677 (1990);John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Propo-
salfor a New U.S. Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 L. & POL'v INT'L Bus. 477 (1997); see also Morrison
v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882-87 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Anthony Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv.
1019 (2011) (developing a unified approach to extraterritoriality); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual
Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 110 (2010); Austin Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1455 (2008); Todd Keithley, Note, Does the National Labor Relations Act Extend to Americans
Who Are Temporarily Abroad?, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2135 (2005).
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and contours of constitutional limits under Congress's power
to legislate extraterritorially in the first place and the potential
for individual rights violations under the Due Process Clause
resulting from arbitrary or unfair applications of U.S. law
abroad.
32
He notes that two lines of extraterritoriality scholarship have
arisen: one line regarding how to determine the scope of statutes
that deal with extraterritoriality, and a more recently developed
line evaluating the constitutionality of such statutes. 3
The academic discussion is silent, however, on purely domestic
statutes that have positive extraterritorial effects and whether such
effects should have relevance for the passage of domestic criminal
laws. For instance, federal drug trafficking laws relate to domestic
crime control but also seek to stem the tide of money flowing south
to Mexico in exchange for illegal drugs. Most violent crimes do not
generally create any clear extraterritorial effects,3 4 so laws regulat-
ing these crimes have a purely domestic impact. As noted above,
securities laws and antitrust laws often have certain extraterritorial
effects, which are oft-debated and subject to vigorous academic
discussion.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is one criminal stat-
ute specifically intended to have extraterritorial effects.3 5 It gener-
ally seeks to curb bribery by all firms and individuals subject to the
securities laws of the United States who engage in business in for-
eign countries, and prohibits "corrupt payments to foreign officials
for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business."3 6 In the legisla-
tive history of revisions to the FCPA, Congress' Conference Report
noted the FCPA's objectives primarily pertain to U.S. trade relation-
ships3 7 rather than to promoting fair and honest trade practices
worldwide. The Department of Justice (DOJ) stated that "Congress
enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials
and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American
business system."38 It is clear, however, that passage of the FCPA did
not necessarily curb bribery around the world and did not have the
32. Colangelo, supra note 31, at 1022.
33. Id.
34. This is more a thought experiment than anything else; it is rare to see a murder,
assault, battery, or other violent crime charged that takes place in the United States but
actually has extraterritorial effects.
35. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
36. Id.; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, 1, http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
37. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 916 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
38. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 1-2.
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intended effect: "In 1997, . .. the United States and thirty-three
other countries signed the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development] Convention on Combatting Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions."39 Hence, although the FCPA is a domestic criminal statute
with extraterritorial effects, twenty years after passage of the FCPA,
the United States still sought a multilateral approach to curb brib-
ery of foreign officials.
Firearms offenses, however, are in a separate class of their own.
The United States has an odd relationship with firearms, extending
back to the passage of the Bill of Rights and the Second Amend-
ment. This relationship contributes to the difficulties currently
faced in Mexico, particularly given the extensive and powerful lob-
bying arm of the National Rifle Association (NRA) .4 While Con-
gress is, as of this writing, conducting inquiries into Mexican drug
violence and the U.S. government's role in that violence, it has not
acted to stem the tide of the violence. The extraterritorial effects of
a domestic firearms trafficking statute should be a paramount con-
sideration of Congress, as such effects should-and would-out-
weigh the domestic concerns voiced by the NRA and libertarian or
other conservative groups.
Firearms trafficking and gun control occupy a place of tension in
the law, and gun control advocates tend to focus primarily on do-
mestic gun control.41 As Franklin Zimring notes, gun control legis-
lative proposals did not receive serious attention until at least
1965.42 This changed in 1968, after the assassinations of Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, along with public unrest and
uneasiness about increased violent crime. 43 The result was the Gun
Control Act of 1968, which imposed a number of controls on fire-
arms, especially relative to convicted felons. 44 The major objectives
of the Gun Control Act of 1968 were eliminating interstate traffic in
39. Id.
40. Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Feel Pressure from Gun Lobby on Contempt Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/house-democrats-up-for-re-election
-feel-gun-obb)-pressure-on-contempt-vote.html ("NRA leaders are convinced that [Opera-
tion Fast and Furious] was started to prove the Justice Department's contention that 90 per-
cent of the weapons fueling the Mexican drug wars come from the United States and that
tighter gun laws are needed.").
41. Franklin E. Zimring, Continuity and Change in the American Gun Control Debate, in
GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 148-49 (Bernard Harcourt ed., 2003).
42. Id. at 148.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEG. STUD. 133, 147-48 (1975).
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firearms and ammunition, denying firearms to groups such as mi-
nors and convicted felons, and ceasing imports of surplus military
firearms other than sporting weapons.4 5 Congress sought to address
domestic crime and violence and did not indicate any intent to en-
sure the safety of people outside the United States.
II. THE PROBLEM OF FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
Mexico has a violence problem. 46 Due to drug cartel activities
and violent acts carried out by drug cartel workers, more than forty-
seven thousand Mexican citizens-including many not associated
in any way with the cartels-have died from drug violence since
2006.47 Entire villages and towns are in lockdown; even industrial
cities are subject to drug cartel terror.4 The politics of drug vio-
lence in Mexico affect the national scene. According to the most
recent U.S. government report, "47,515 people were killed in nar-
cotics-related violence in Mexico between December 1, 2006 and
September 30, 2011." 49 Continuing into 2012, between April and
May 2012, cartels decapitated fourteen people and left their head-
less bodies in front of city hall in Nuevo Laredo, hung nine people
from a bridge in that same city, left eighteen decapitated bodies in
an area frequented by tourists near Guadalajara, and unloaded
forty-nine headless (and footless and handless) bodies out of a
dump truck near Monterrey, Mexico's industrial capital.5 0  Maria
45. Zimring, supra note 41, at 149.
46. As of 2009, Mexican officials, speaking to congressional investigators, indicated that
"they now regard illicit firearms as the number one crime problem affecting the country's
security, and they are intent on working with their U.S. counterparts to address the threat
posed by weapons smuggling." GAO. supra note 7, at 10.
47. The most recent statistics, from January 2012, indicate that 47,515 people have died
due to drug cartel violence since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December
2006. Q&A: Mexico's Drug-Related Violence, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249; see also Maloney, supra note 2; Zagaris,
supra note 2.
48. SEELKE, supra note 3, at 5-6,
49. Travel Warning, TRAVELSTA-rTE.Gov (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://travel.state
.gov/travel/cis_patw/tw/tw_5665.html; see also Maria Baldini-Potermin, Making the Case for
Mexicans Seeking Relief from Persecution and Torture: Asylum, Withholding and Relief Under the Con-
vention Against Torture, 11-08 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Aug. 2011) (noting between 35,000 and
40,000 have been killed since December 2006); Randal C. Archibold, More Than 20 Shot Dead
in Monterrey, Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, http://nyti.ms/mT9BWz.
50. William Booth, Mexico's Two Major Crime Cartels Now at War, WASH. POST, May 24,
2012, h ttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-americas/mexicos-two-major-crime-
cartels-now-at-war/2012/05/24/gJQAUhKlmU print.html; William Booth, In Nuevo Laredo,
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Baldini-Potermin has observed, "The killings over the last four and
one-half years have been gruesome and public, with mass graves,
torture, decapitations as a trademark, severing of body parts, and
warnings carved into corpses." 51 All of this is fueled, at least in part,
by firearms, which generally are prohibited in Mexico.
52
It is clear that the United States and Mexico both seek to curtail
violence south of the border. It is also clear that, at least since 2008,
the United States is aware of its role as a source of firearms for
DTOs in Mexico. In February 2008, the Assistant Director of ATF's
Office of Field Operations testified to Congress:
Mexican drug trafficking organizations have aggressively
turned to the U.S. as a source of firearms. These weapons are
used against other DTOs, the Mexican military, Mexican and
United States law enforcement officials, as well as civilians on
both sides of the border.... Recently, the weapons sought by
drug trafficking organizations have become increasingly
higher quality and more powerful.5 3
The United States and Mexico do not appear interested in ignor-
ing the problems created by drug violence in Mexico. In October
2007, both countries launched the Merida Initiative, which provides
for increased interaction to combat drug cartels through greater
coordinated efforts. 54 That initiative set out parameters to provide
51. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 49, at n.9.
52. See Chris Hawley, Mexico: Gun Controls Undermined by U.S., USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/rnews/world/2009-03-31-mexicogunsLN.htm. (noting that "Mex-
ico has some of the toughest gun-control laws in the world"); Guns Are Illegal in Mexico, CON-
SULATE GEN. OF THE U.S., http://tijuana.usconsulate.gov/tijuana/warning.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2012).
53. U.S. Obligations, supra note 1, at 19-25 (testimony of William J. Hoover, Assistant
Director, Office of Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
U.S. Dep't of Justice); see also ATF Testimony, BuREAu OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOsIvEs, http://www.atf.gov/press/releases/2008/02/020708-testimony-atf-ad-hoover-sw-
border.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
54. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1406(a), 122 Star. 2323
(2008). For commentary on the Merida Initiative, see generally Stephanie Erin Brewer, Re-
thinking the Merida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change Course in Its Approach to Mexico's Drug
War, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF no. 3, Spring 2009, at 9; Steven E. Herdrix, The Merida Initiative Jor
Mexico and Central America: The New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime,
Corruption and Violence, 5 Loy. U. CHI. iNT'L L. REV. 107 (2008); Ryan Hoskin, Mexican Drug
Violence: Why the Merida Initiative, Gun Bans and Border Controls Will Fail and Drug Reform Is the
Solution, 4 NEW VOICES IN PUB. POLY 1-24 (2010), available at http://journals.gmu.edu/index
.php/newvoices/article/viewFile/133/106; Ray Walser, Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida
Initiative: A Fight We Cannot Afford to Lose, HERITAGE FOUND. EXEC. SUMMARY BACKGROUNDER,
no. 2163, July 23, 2008, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf-media/2008/pdf/
bg2163.pdf.
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money to the Mexican government to purchase ion scanners; ca-
nine units to interdict drugs, firearms, and cash; as well as purchas-
ing helicopters and non-intrusive inspection equipment.55 It also
sought to provide advice and training for Mexican authorities and
money to vet Mexican police officers.5 6
The United States and Mexico did not stop at merely throwing
money at the problem through the Merida Initiative. Over a year
later, on August 13, 2009, the two governments signed a letter of
intent calling for the development of a "coordinated and intelli-
gence-based response to the threat of cross-border smuggling and
trafficking of weapons and ammunition."57 Since that time, there
have been numerous calls for coordination between the ATF and
the Mexican government as well as discussions about further agency
cooperation. Although coordination efforts have increased, there
remains a gulf between the two governments and their respective
agencies regarding drug interdiction and drug violence.
A. Statistics and Costs
It is clear that drug violence in Mexico continues unabated. Over
a six-day period at the end of August 2011, fifteen people were
killed in the Tjuana area.58 By September 7, 2011, another twelve
had been killed-a total of twenty-seven deaths caused by Tijuana
drug violence over a two-week period. 59 And more than six months
later, the violence only appeared to be getting worse: between April
and May 2012, two warring cartels60 engaged in incredibly violent
55. Walser, supra note 54, at 3.
56. Id.
57. Bruce Zagaris, US. and Mexico Develop Investigative Cooperation on International Firearns
Trafficking Cases, 25 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 468, 468 (2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, DOJ, DHS and Mexico Announce Arrangement to Bolster Investigative Cooperation
on International Firearms Trafficking Cases (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-odag-796.html.
58. Omar Milldn, 15 People Killed in Last Six Days in Tijuana, SAN DIEGO RED (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.sandiegored.com/noticias/18015/15-people-killed-in-last-six-days-in-
Tijuana/ (noting that killings are down in the state of Baja by about 180 people from one
year ago).
59. Omar Milln, 27 Killed in Two Weeks in Tijuana Drug Violence, SAN DIEGO RED (Sept. 7,
2011), http://www.sandiegored.com/noticias/18463/27-killed-in-two-weeks-in-Tijuana-drug-
violence/. The death toll for the State of Baja alone is 353 for 2011, and "authorities estimate
that 80 percent of the murders can be attributed to conflicts among criminal bands over the
sale of illegal drugs on the street." Id.
60. The Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel are the two main warring cartels. Booth, Mexico
Cartel War, supra note 50. The Sinaloa cartel is more established and headed by Mexico's
notorious Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman. JUNE S. BErrrEL, CONG. REsEARcii SERV., R41576,
MEXICO'S DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF T1-E RISING VIOLENCE
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and sadistic behavior in three separate Mexican cities.61 Daily news
reports from Mexico demonstrate the clear physical and emotional
toll of this violence on Mexican citizens. 62 It is hard to argue that
drug violence in Mexico is being "dealt with" or that the Mexican
government has curbed it. Rather, the Mexican government does
not appear to have a handle on this violence nor has the U.S. gov-
ernment provided resources or other measures that have effectively
reduced it.
The economic toll from the violence in Mexico is less clear but
arguably just as devastating.63 Despite conventional wisdom, Mex-
ico's Finance Minister, Ernest Cordero, announced that Mexico's
tourism economy seemed unaffected by the current drug vio-
lencef 4 While stating that some cities were clearly suffering, Minis-
ter Cordero indicated that Mexico's economy "grew by 5.5% last
26-27 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. The Zetas started
out as a group of ex-Mexican Special Forces that provided security for several of the cartels,
but eventually branched out, deeming it more lucrative to engage in drug trafficking them-
selves. See id. at 8; see also Farhanna Hossain & Xaquin G.V., The Reach of Mexico's Drug Cartels,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/03/22/us/BORDER.
html?ref=drugtrafficking (describing the circles of control, including the overlap with the
Sinaloa Cartel, the Zetas organization, and the Beltran Leyva organization).
61. BErerEL, supra note 60, at 21.
62. Randal C. Archibold, Mexico's Drug War Bloodies Areas Thought Safe, N.Y. TimEs, Jan.
18, 2012, http://www.n)times.com/2012/01/19/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-bloodies-
areas-thought-safe.html?_r-l&hp=&pagewanted=all; Damien Cave, Mexico Updates Death Toll
in Drug War to 47,515, but Critics Dispute the Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, http://www.ny
times.com/ 201 201/ 12/wo rld/americas/ mexico-updates-drug-war-death-to l-but- ritics-
dispute-data.htmlref=Americas (noting that although the homicide rate increase has been
lower compared to previous years, "that will hardly calm a public scared by the recent arrival
of grisly violence in once-safe cities like Guadalajara"). Social media demonstrates clear fear
and disgust by Mexico's residents. For instance, after discovery of twenty-three corpses in
Nuevo Laredo, one tweet stated that "[w] e have no law in Nuevo Laredo. Welcome to the
jungle!" Booth, Nuevo Laredo Corpses, supra note 50. Businesses in Mexico are seeking to con-
tain violence by helping state governments recruit "new, uncorrupted police officers" and
market a safer Mexico. Elisabeth Malkin, With Stake in Stability, Businesses in Mexico Help City
Shaken by Violence, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/world/
americas/mexican-businesses-pitch-in-to-coun ter-violence-in-monterrey.hunl?pagewanted=
call.
63. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, *CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41402, THE MEXICAN ECONOMy AF-
TER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 17 (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/148789.pdf ("The escalation of violence has resulted in increased risk aversion
which has impacted foreign investment flows, particularly in the manufacturing industry....
Some estimates of the costs associated with violence, investment losses, drug abuse, and other
direct costs are estimated at $4.6 billion per year, or 0.5% of GDP."); Christian Watjen, Mex-
ico's Drug Violence Drags Down Economic Recovery, TIE EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://
www. theepochtimes.com/n2/world/mexicos-drug-violence-drags-down-economic-recovery-
59132.html; Mexico Says Drug Violence Dents Economy, FoxBUSINESS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://
www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/09/01/mexico-says-drug-violencedents-economy/.
64. Mexico Economy Unharmed by Violence-Finance Minister, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011,
10:54 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12818647.
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year, its fastest annual rate in 10 years." 6- This statement contradicts
other reports that demonstrate the drug violence has taken a clear
toll on the Mexican economy. In August 2010, for instance, reports
surfaced that "[s]ome areas of Mexico along the U.S. border have
been paraly[z]ed economically by drug violence."66 Border cities
like Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros saw a decline in business activity
due to bloody turf battles between drug gangs. 67 Recently, the U.S.
Department of State provided a detailed travel advisory for Mexico,
cautioning U.S. citizens to defer non-essential travel to numerous
areas in the country. 68 Despite official reports by the Mexican gov-
ernment, the anecdotal evidence, 69 especially in the tourism indus-
try, demonstrates that drug violence in Mexico has a clear
detrimental effect on the economy. Although there are numerous
contradictory statements about the effects of drug violence in Mex-
ico, 7 0 the violence is clearly not a good thing.
B. The Current U.S. Legal Framework for Firearms Trafficking
Given that Mexican drug violence ultimately stems from firearms
in the hands of Mexican drug traffickers, and many7' of these fire-
arms may have arrived in Mexico through U.S. operations, one
wonders why Operation Fast and Furious occurred in the first
place. To understand how Fast and Furious came about, it makes
sense to turn to the current U.S. domestic firearms trafficking laws.
In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
65. Id.




68. See TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, supra note 49 (outlining the general conditions in Mexico,
including its war with transnational criminal organizations, and urging the deferral of non-
essential travel to a number of Mexican states).
69. See BEn-rEL, supra note 60, at 27 ("As it has spread to new locations, the fear of
violence has closed businesses and had an impact on tourism. American investors in Mexico
have grown concerned about the violence and businesses have sent home dependents or
closed operations altogether in some cities.").
70. Id. at 26-27 ("The Mexican government recently published a report indicating that
foreign direct investment (FDI) has continued to pour into some of the most violent states at
levels exceeding the investment prior to 2006, but others argue that job creating investment
has been moving into safer cities in central Mexico where drug trafficking-related violence is
lower.").
71. Of course, a number of weapons sold legally by the United States government also
fall into the hands of drug cartels as well. See Sharyl Attkisson, Legal U.S. Gun Sales to Mexico
Arming Cartels, CBSNEws.coM (Dec. 11, 2011) http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500202-162-57
337289 /legal-u.s-gun-sales-to-mexico-arming-cartels.
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Streets Act, which provided a number of new statutes governing
criminal violations 2 Congress passed this Act in response to court
rulings on state wiretapping statutes 73 and to "findings concerning
the impact of the traffic in firearms on the prevalence of lawlessness
and violent crime in the United States."'74 At the time, Congress was
not concerned with the outbound flow of firearms to other coun-
tries,75 only with the domestic provision of firearms to those persons
within the country who should not have them.
The Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 and currently regulates
"firearms trafficking. ' 76 It criminalizes a number of activities relat-
ing to firearms, including (with certain caveats) being "engaged in
the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or
in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any fire-
arm in interstate or foreign commerce. '' 77 This provision makes it
illegal for "any importer, manufacturer, [or] dealer . . . to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm to any per-
son other than" a licensed firearm trafficker.78 The statute criminal-
izes the transport or receipt of any firearm purchased or obtained
in another state, 79 as well as the transfer, sale, or trade of a firearm
72. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197-239
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18 & 42 U.S.C.); see also Bryan v.
United States, 524 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1998) (outlining the Act's criminal firearms provisions).
73. The Supreme Court invalidated New York's state wiretapping law in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and explained the Fourth Amendment requirements for a proper
wiretapping statute. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 505-06 (12th ed. 2008). In
that same year, the Court also commented oil warrantless interception of telephone calls by
bug in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), thereby laying the groundwork for the fed-
eral wiretapping statute within the Omnibus Criminal Control Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2006); see also David Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits of Aphorism, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SToRIES 250 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); Stewart M. Young, Targeting the
Person: Roving Wiretaps and the Changing Nature of Electronic Surveillance (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (laying out the general history of the wiretapping statute in
relation to Berger and Katz).
74. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 186-87 (emphasis added).
75. In fact, the Gun Control Act's legislative history notes Congress' concern with sur-
plus military firearms coming from outside the country. See Zimring, supra note 44, at 149.
76. Oddly enough, the term "trafficking" does not appear in the Gun Control Act ex-
cept when referring to "drug trafficking." See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1), 924(g), 929 (2006). The
Inspector General's Report on Project Gunrunner noted this particular oddity. See OFFICE OF
INSPECrOR GEN., supra note 19, at 59 & n.78.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (A) (2006). § 922(a)(1)(B) criminalizes the same actions with
regard to ammunition.
78. § 922(a) (2). The term "licensed trafficker" is not a definitional term in the statute. It
is merely a descriptive term for purposes of this Article for a person who is a "licensed im-
porter, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector." Id. For these excep-
tions, I like to use the term "legal trafficker" or "licensed trafficker."
79. § 922(a) (3).
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to another person who does not reside in the state where the trans-
feror resides.80 Finally, the "lie-and-buy" statute-the bread and but-
ter of firearms prosecutions-criminalizes the "acquisition or
attempted acquisition of any firearm" by knowingly making "any
false or fictitious" statements to acquire a firearm."'
18 U.S.C. § 922 criminalizes other activities by licensed traffick-
ers. For instance, licensed traffickers may not sell firearms to any-
one under the age of eighteen 2 or to anyone who is not a resident
of the state.8 3 Licensed traffickers also may not sell machine guns,
destructive devices, or short-barreled shotguns unless authorized by
the Attorney General as "consistent with public safety and neces-
sity."8 4 The statute also criminalizes the disposition or sale of any
firearm to any person who is under indictment, has been convicted
of a felony,85 is a fugitive from justice,8 6 abuses narcotics,87 or is an
alien unlawfully present in the United States.8 Finally, it is unlawful
to deliver firearms to a common carrier without notice to that
carrier.89
What is missing is a statute that criminalizes "trafficking in fire-
arms."90 The only "trafficking" contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 922 is
trafficking done by someone "engaged in the business of importing
... or dealing in firearms."9 1 Congress defined this portion of that
statute in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)-(22):
(21) The term "engaged in the business" means-
(C) as applied to a dealer in firearms, . . . a person who de-
votes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular
course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood
80. § 922(a) (5).
81. § 922(a) (6). This provision criminalizes both lying to procure a firearm for oneself
and the lie itself. Id.
82. § 922(b) (1).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (2006).
84. § 922(b) (4).
85. § 922(d) (1).
86. § 922(d) (2).
87. § 922(d) (3).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d) (5) (A) (2006). It also criminalizes these sales to an alien that has
a nonimmigrant visa. § 922(d) (5) (B).
89. § 922(e).
90. Again, note the oddity of the lack of the term "trafficking" in 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-929,
except when referring to "drug trafficking." See, e.g., §§ 924(c) (1), 9 24(g), 929 (2006); see also
supra text accompanying note 76.
91. §§ 924(c)(1), 924(g), 929.
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and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of fire-
arms, but such term shall not include a person who makes oc-
casional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the
enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who
sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms....
The statute further defines "engaged in the business" with re-
spect to an importer of firearms92 and ammunition. 93 18 U.S.C.
§ 921 also defines "livelihood and profit":
(22) The term "with the principal objective of livelihood and
profit" means that the intent underlying the sale or disposition
of firearms is predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and
pecuniary gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving
or liquidating a personal firearms collection: Provided, That
proof of profit shall not be required as to a person who en-
gages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of
firearms for criminal purposes or terrorism.
94
The current statute further defines dealer,95 importer,96 and
manufacturer9 7-a group I term "legal traffickers." The cases that
arise under this statute, however, usually turn on the "engaged in
the business" prong. A number of the federal criminal pattern jury
92. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (22)(E) (2006) ("[A]s applied to an importer of firearms, a per-
son who devotes time, attention, and labor to importing firearms as a regular course of trade
or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or distribu-
tion of the firearms imported.").
93. § 921 (a) (21) (F) ("[A]s applied to an importer of ammunition, a person who de-
votes time, attention, and labor to importing ammunition as a regular course of trade or
business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or distribution
of the ammunition imported.").
94. § 921(a) (21)-(22).
95. § 921(a)(11) ("The term 'dealer' means (A) any person engaged in the business of
selling firearms at wholesale or retail, (B) any person engaged in the business of repairing
firearms or of making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms, or
(C) any person who is a pawnbroker. The term 'licensed dealer' means any dealer who is
licensed under the provisions of this chapter.").
96. § 921(a)(9) ("The term 'importer' means any person engaged in the business of
importing or bringing firearms or ammunition into the United States for purposes of sale or
distribution; and the term 'licensed importer' means any such person licensed under the
provisions of this chapter.").
97. § 921(a) (10) ("The term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business
of manufacturing firearms or ammunition for purposes of sale or distribution; and the term
'licensed manufacturer' means any such person licensed under the provisions of this
chapter.").
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instructions essentially mirror the statutory language and
definitions. 9
1. Historic Issues with "Engaged in the Business" and "Profit"
For quite some time, courts have wrestled with the "engaged in
the business" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 922. The statute does not define
what it means to be "engaged in the business" of dealing in fire-
arms, nor is there any indication in the legislative history or other
relevant documentation that helps courts to easily define this
term.99 Given this lack of a definition, courts have had to consider
the scope and meaning of this language without any clear gui-
dance. In 1975, the Tenth Circuit considered the scope of this lan-
guage for the first time in United States v. Swinton.100 In that case,
Swinton told ATF agents that he had stolen guns for sale and tried
numerous times to buy guns for the agents.' 0 ' The Tenth Circuit
proceeded to consider whether it should use the definition of "busi-
ness"102 from Cherot v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 103 The
Swinton court noted that Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit cases
supported Swinton's argument that "business" meant "an undertak-
ing engaged with some regularity and for profit and income."'' 0 4
The court referenced United States v. Day,o 5 in which it found the
98. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FiFrr- CIRCUIT, FIFTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.44 (2001) (entitled "Dealing in Firearms Without License" and includ-
ing the "engaged in the business" definition and "livelihood and profit" prong in the instruc-
tions); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, NINTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 8.53 (2010) (entitled "Firearms-Dealing, Importing or Manufacturing
Without Licenses" (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) & (B) (2006)), and including the
"primary source of income" notation and the "time, attention and labor to selling firearms"
notation in the Comment but not in the instructions themselves); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 34.1
(2010) (entitled "Dealing in Firearms Without a License," codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a) (1) (A) (2006), and noting, "The 'principal objective of livelihood and profit' is the
intent to earn a living or make some money from the regular sale of firearms-not just to
improve a person's collection or reduce a personal collection. Whether profit actually results
does not matter."). The Tenth Circuit's criminal pattern instructions define "firearm" but
neither "engaged in the business" nor the profit motive. They do address those terms in
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, TENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.41 Use Note (2011) (entitled "Dealing in Firearms Without License,"
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) (A) (2006)).
99. See infta notes 339-343 and accompanying text.
100. 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 1256-57. He ultimately purchased one gun, a sawed-off shotgun. Id.
102. Id. at 1258.
103. 264 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959).
104. Swinton, 521 F.2d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. 476 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1973).
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Sixth Circuit to have held that a person was "engaged in the busi-
ness of dealing in firearms if such an activity occupies the person's
time, attention, and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit."116
The court also mentioned the Seventh Circuit's decision in United
States v. Gross,10 7 which the court said stood for the proposition that
"'dealer' meant anyone engaged in the business of selling firearms;
and that the word 'business' referred to that which occupies time,
attention, and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit."0 8
The Swinton court also noted "contrary decisions" from both the
Eighth Circuit and the Southern District of Ohio, which the court
deemed to have held that a profit motive need not exist to charge
someone with being "engaged in the business of dealing in fire-
arms."10 9 The Swinton court noted that the Eighth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Wilkening" held that "the offense of dealing in
firearms did not require that the defendant's primary business be
dealing in firearms or that he make a certain profit from it." ' And
it noted that United States v. Jackson,"12 heard in the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio, held that "one is engaged in the 'business of dealing
in firearms' if he has guns on hand or is ready and able to procure
them for the purpose of selling them to those persons he accepts as
customers."113
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit sided with the Eighth Circuit, hold-
ing in Swinton that the statute did "not require that the Government
establish that a person engaged in the business of dealing in fire-
arms make a profit, even though the 'dealing' activity requires time,
attention and effort."' 1 4 The Ninth Circuit later disagreed, holding
in United States v. Van Buren'1 5 that "where transactions of sale,
purchase or exchange of firearms are regularly entered into in ex-
pectation of profit, the conduct amounts to engaging in
business."' 16
Congress then took action in response to this circuit split. It is
important to note that the term "engaged in business" was not al-
ways in the statute. In 1986, Congress added this term, and further
amended the statute to require the existence of a profit motive for
106. Swinton, 521 F.2d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971).
108. United States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 1975).
109. Id.
110. 485 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1973).
111. Swinton, 521 F.2d at 1258.
112. 352 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
113. Swinton, 521 F.2d at 1258.
114. Id.
115. 593 F,2d 125 (9th Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 126.
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persons to "be in the business of dealing in firearms."' 17 Firearms
trafficking cases dropped precipitously after this amendment, and
further issues hamstrung the ATF over time. For instance, the num-
ber of ATF agents from 1971 to the present stayed constant at
2,500, although law enforcement agents in other agencies in-
creased dramatically. Congress's passage of the Tiahrt Amendment,
which restricted the information that the ATF may provide to the
public about firearms (and firearms trafficking), compounded the
difficulties of prosecuting firearms violations.1 8
I actually dealt with this specific issue as a federal prosecutor dur-
ing one gunrunning operation. In San Diego, ATF agents engaged
a confidential informant (CI) who had purchased firearms in Ari-
zona from a target of the investigation. The target offered to sell
the CI more weapons, particularly long guns (rifles and shotguns).
The agents told the CI to tell the target defendant that he needed
to buy more weapons and "take them south." The clear implication
was that these weapons were heading to Mexico, which the target
defendant understood and often remarked on. At times, the target
defendant mentioned the drug violence in Mexico (this was in
2008), but did not seem overly concerned that he might be contrib-
uting to that violence by selling firearms to the CI.
During the operation, the target defendant sold the CI more
than twenty guns, including a number of AK-47-type rifles. During
the culmination of the operation, agents executed a search warrant
and searched the target defendant's house, finding more than sixty-
five other firearms. After the takedown, the target defendant's
counsel began the negotiation process, and it became clear that the
"[engagement] in the business of ... dealing in firearms" prong
would be the critical issue. Additionally, the defense counsel made
117. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 450 (1986),
amended by Pub. L. No. 99-360, 100 Stat, 776 (1986) ("[T]he profit motive is not required if a
person engages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms for crimi-
nal purposes or terrorism."). While certain cases held that a profit motive was required to be
"engaged in the business of dealing in firearms," the above Act removed that requirement.
See also United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[T he definition
[of engaged in the business] was added to the firearms statute by Congress in 1986, to resolve
a circuit split regarding the meaning of the term as it applies in the firearms statute."); H.
Rep. No. 99-495, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1338 ("Courts have not
been unanimous regarding the question whether a profit motive is an essential ingredient in
determining if one is 'engaged in the business' of firearms."); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRucrIONs 78 (1988).
118. See generally Colin Miller, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Why the Tiahrt Amendment's Ban on
the Admissibility of ATF Trace Data in State Court Actions Violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, 2010 UTAH. L. REv. 665; AngelaJacqueline Tang, Note, Taking Aim at Tiahrt, 50
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1787 (2009).
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a convincing argument that these firearms were sold from the de-
fendant's personal collection, thereby demonstrating that he was
not "engaged in the business." Indeed, the target defendant would
often complain on the recordings from the takedown that he was
not making any profit on some of the transactions, despite his will-
ingness to drive from Arizona to San Diego to facilitate them. The
violation appeared clear on its face-selling one gun was to "en-
gage in the business"-but the U.S. Attorney's Office was con-
cerned, and rightly so, that the court might not see it that way.
Ultimately, I re-indicted the target defendant for transporting fire-
arms across state lines, which had lesser penalties but lacked any
problems of proof. This experience is typical. One supervisor in the
ATF has noted "the lack of a "'firearms trafficking statute"' and
"the toothless nature of the 'straw purchasing law"' in Congres-
sional testimony.'1 9 Ultimately, the statute lacks any real punch-
the profit motive requirement and the "engaged in the business"
prong make proving firearms trafficking quite difficult. The tooth-
less nature of the gun statutes in general, specifically those that
cover firearms trafficking, demonstrates the need for a true fire-
arms trafficking statute.
The ATF is not necessarily the sole agency responsible for focus-
ing on firearms trafficking. While the ATF has primary responsibil-
ity, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (like its
predecessor, the U.S. Customs Service)12 0  is responsible for
enforcing U.S. export laws, including "enforcing laws related to the
export of military items and dual-use goods." 121 ICE has historically
promoted public awareness of firearms trafficking to Mexico, but it
generally does not engage in law enforcement efforts similar to
119. Operation Fast and Furious: Reckless Decisions, Tragic Outcomes: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov'tReform, 112th Cong. 107-13 (2011) (statement of PeterJ. Forcelli,
Supervisory Special Agent, ATF); see also Interview by House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform with ATF Special Agent Carlos Canino, at 59-60 (June 16, 2011), in MINORITY STAr
or H. Comm. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORMa, OUTGUNNEn, supra note 21, at 11 ("A traffick-
ing statute would be helpful, too .... What we want to do is we want to stop otherwise legal
guns from getting into an illegal secondary market."); Interview by House Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov't Reform with ATF Special Agent Olindo "Lee" Casa, at 81-82 (Apr. 28, 2011), in
MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, OUTGUNNED, supra note 21, at
11 ("There is really no trafficking, firearms trafficking statute, per se. It would be nice to have
a trafficking statute per se ... just to be [sic] a deterrent effect.").
120. ICE is the "principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) .. .created in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement
elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Over-
view, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
121. GAO, supra note 7, at 11 & n.6.
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those of the ATF. 22 Customs and Border Protection (CBP)1 23 also
plays a role "in intercepting southbound illicit firearms at the bor-
der, [but] southbound inspections of vehicles and persons traveling
from the United States to Mexico have generally not been a focus
of CBP's efforts."' 2 4 Nevertheless, the current legal regime for fire-
arms trafficking offenses focuses solely on "dealing in firearms,"
and the ATF generally is the agency most responsible for investigat-
ing firearms offenses.
2. The Federal Assault Weapons Ban: R.I.P. 2004
In previous administrations, the United States enacted certain
bans that altered the legality of the purchase or possession of cer-
tain weapons, thereby affecting Mexican drug cartels' access to such
weapons. From 1994 to 2004, the federal assault weapons ban
(FAWB)' 2 5 was in place, which covered a "first time restriction on
the manufacture, transfer and possession of semi-automatic weap-
ons."'26 This ban defined the term "assault weapons" and restricted
possession of certain firearms in accordance with that definition.
27
The ban further restricted the manufacture of assault weapons,
criminalized the possession of illegally imported assault weapons,
122. See id. at 10-11. For instance, ICE disseminated brochures and posters to educate
firearms purchasers regarding U.S. firearms and smuggling laws. As part of its border en-
forcement duties, ICE has recently worked to "expand seizures of firearms destined for Mex-
ico on the U.S. side of the border." Id. (footnote omitted). Furthermore, it has worked to
provide "end use verification checks for firearms lawfully exported to Mexican government
entities" to ensure those lawful firearms exports go to the appropriate authorities. Id. at 11.
123. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for both manning the ports of entry
(the CBP arm) and manning the borders between the ports of entry (the Border Patrol arm).
See Border Patrol History, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_
security/borderpatrol/border._patrol ohs/history.xml (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). On
March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security consolidated the U.S. Border Patrol
into U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Id.
124. GAO, supra note 7, at 12-13, 34-39 & n.9.
125. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 110101-110106, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (containing the "Federal Assault Weapons Ban"
and its sunset provisions set for Sept. 13, 2004) [hereinafter FAWB]; see also CHRISTOPHER S.
KOPER, DANIEL J. Woons & JEFFREY A. ROTH, AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL As-
SAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN VIOI.ENCE, 1994-2003, REPORT TO
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE (2004), available
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/204431.pdf (assessing the domestic impact on
crime from the FAWB).
126. Dube et al., supra note 18.
127. FAWB §§ 110102(a) (entitled "Restriction on Manufacture, Transfer and Possession
of Certain Semiautomatic Assault Weapons" and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1)-(3)) &
110102(b) (entitled "Definition of Semiautomatic Assault Weapon" and codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a) (30)).
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and restricted the transfer of assault weapons that were not manu-
factured before the implementation of the FAWB. 128 States also had
their own bans on such weapons, including California 12 9 and New
York'30 among others.'13
Several recent empirical studies of Mexican violence from 2002
to 2006 demonstrate the efficacy of the FAWB.132 Controlling for a
number of variables, including cartel destabilization, local violence,
and distance from the border, Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube,
and Omar Garcia-Ponce investigated the number of homicides and
gun-related homicides during this period. The authors of the study
theorized that gun-related homicides might increase in U.S.-Mexico
border municipalities (cities within one-hundred miles of the bor-
der that encompassed a major highway and were near a well-traf-
ficked port of entry) after the 2004 expiration of the federal assault
weapons ban. 33 Given that California continued its own state-con-
trolled ban on these weapons, the authors further posited that Mex-
ican border municipalities along the Arizona and Texas border
might experience greater violence than municipalities along the
California border.1 3
4
Ultimately, the data demonstrated that after the FAWB expired,
Mexican border municipalities within one hundred miles of the Ar-
izona and Texas border experienced "differential increases in total
homicides, homicides tied specifically to guns, as well as criminal
convictions for murders and gun-related offenses in the post-2004
period."'' 35 Indeed, it appears that municipalities at the Arizona and
Texas border ports saw total homicides rise by 40 percent com-
pared with municipalities one hundred miles away. 136 These results
demonstrate that the FAWB provided at least some deterrent effect
128. § 110102(a).
129. See CAL. PENAL CODE. §§ 12275-12290 (Deering 2012) (containing California's as-
sault weapon ban). Cal. Sen. Bill 23 apparently increased the reach of California's ban. Dube
et al., supra note 18, at 6.
130. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(6) (McKinney 2010).
131. Other states that have assault weapons bans include Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts and New Jersey. See LEGAL CMTy. AGAINST VIOLENCE, BANNING ASSAULT WEAP-
ONs: A LEGAL PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACrION, 5-6, 20 (2004), available at http://
smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Banning.AssaultWeapons_A_- Legal
Primer_8.05_entire.pdf; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-202a to -202o (2009); HAw. REv.
STAT. §§ 134-1, -4, -8 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 140, §§ 121-23, 131 & 131M
(West 2007), MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw §§ 4-301 to -306 (West 2012); N.J STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:39-1w, 2C:39-5, 2C:58-5, 2C:58-12, 2C:58-13 (West 2005).
132. See, e.g., Dube et al., supra note 18.
133. Id. at 2-3.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 26.
136. Id. The authors posit that this "impluies] an additional 158 more homicides in the
two years following the expiration of the FAWB." Id.
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given the lack of a readily available supply of firearms smuggled to
Mexico during the implementation of the FAWB. 137 Of course, as
noted above, the amount of violence has dramatically increased
since 2006 (the end point of the study).'1
8
This study demonstrates the efficacy of looking at U.S. domestic
laws and their extraterritorial effects. In the context of Mexican
drug violence, the study demonstrated that the FAWB clearly had a
positive effect in Mexico. The study showed that violence involving
firearms in Mexico increased after the FAWB expired. Thus, it is
likely that the reverse correlation is also true: the imposition of the
FAWB in 1994 may have decreased firearms-related violence in
Mexico. Clearly, a new FAWB would be important in curbing fur-
ther drug-related violence in Mexico, particularly given that the
previous FAWB banned several of the drug cartels' weapons of
choice. 1
39
A second study, conducted by Luke Chicoine, an economist at
Notre Dame, also studied the effects of the FAWB and its expira-
tion, and came to a similar conclusion as the Dube study.
1 4°
Chicoine examined the time period from 2004 to 2008 and con-
cluded that the expiration of the FAWB led to at least a 16.4 per-
cent increase in Mexico's homicide rate. 141 While the Dube study
specifically examined border municipalities within one hundred
miles of the U.S.-Mexico border, Chicoine analyzed data from every
Mexican state during the FAWB from 2004 through 2008.142 In
Mexican states wherein cartels have a major presence, the study
found that homicide rates rose 24.6 percent after the FAWB ex-
pired, an increase even higher than that observed at the national
level. 143 The study also concluded that this increase amounted to an
additional 2,684 homicides in Mexico from 2004 to 2008.144
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 16-17.
140. Chicoine, supra note 18.
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id at 22.
144. Id. It is important to note that these studies did not consider the effect of President
Calderon's rise to power and his clarion call against the drug cartels. SEELKE, supra note 3, at
6 (noting President Calderon's decision to make "combating drug trafficking and organized
crime a top priority of his administration," and noting the cartels' "increasingly brazen vio-
lence committed by criminal groups, partially in response to government pressure"). At least
some of the increase in deaths should be attributed to President Calderon's decision to tar-
get the drug cartels, but the rise in firearms available after the FAWB expired should also
factor into the equation. Compare id. and Charles Bowden & Molly Molloy, Who Is Behind the
25,000 Deaths in Mexico?, THE NATION, July 23, 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/
37916/who-behind-25000-deaths-mexico# (arguing that the Calderon administration's claim
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The Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice and sev-
eral members of Congress commissioned a study, led by Christo-
pher Koper and his colleagues, of the efficacy of the FAWB in the
United States. 145 The study concluded that gun crimes decreased in
the localities studied between 17 and 72 percent from their respec-
tive rates. 146 The authors also noted, however, that the decline in
use of assault weapons was "due primarily to a reduction in the use
of assault pistols (APs), which are used in crime more commonly
than assault rifles (ARs) .147 They did not find a corresponding
drop or clear decline in the use of assault rifles, because of "the
rarity of crimes with these weapons and by substitution of post-ban
rifles that are very similar to the banned AR models." 14 The study
did not conclude that domestic gun crime dropped due to the
FAWB and noted that any effect of reauthorization would "likely...
be small at best and perhaps too small for reliable measurement."1 49
The study presciently noted that lifting the FAWB would likely
make pre-ban assault weapons lose their "value and novelty,
prompting some of their owners to sell them in undocumented
secondhand markets, where they can more easily reach high-risk
users, such as criminals, terrorists, and other potential mass
murderers."1
5 0
Accordingly, on the domestic side, the FAWB does not seem to
have affected total gun-crime violence in a significant manner, but
it does appear to have affected gun-crime violence markedly in an
extraterritorial manner. Taking the cumulative conclusions of these
studies at face value, the net result is that, at least on the domestic
side, a ban does not have much efficacy. And yet the two studies on
the Mexican side of the equation demonstrate the FAWB had mod-
erate to considerable efficacy in curbing drug violence. One factor
that is likely key to understanding these results emerges from the
Koper study's conclusions regarding the particular weapons used in
that 90 percent of the death toll in Mexico "are criminals" is false and blaming Calderon's
administration for the spike in the death toll); with Chicoine, supra note 18, at 22 and Dube
et al., supra note 18, at 26.
145. KoPER ET AL., supra note 125, at i, 1-3.
146. The localities included Baltimore, Miami, Milwaukee, Boston, St. Louis, and
Anchorage. Id. at 1.
147. Id.
148. Id. But see BRADY CTR. TO PREVENTr GUN VIOLENCE, THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 FEDERAL
ASSAULT WEAPON ACT (2004), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/
on-target.pdf (noting that assault weapons traced to crime dropped approximately 66 per-
cent from the pre-ban rate).
149. KOPER ET AL., supra note 125, at 1-2.
150. Id. at 2.
FALL 2012]
28 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
domestic gun crime: namely, assault rifles are rarely used in domes-
tic criminal activities,15' whereas they are generally the gun of
choice for Mexican DTOs.152 Thus, while supporters of another
FAWB will not find a "smoking gun" in historical studies of domes-
tic efficacy, the extraterritorial effects of the ban provide a clear
rationale for another FAWB.
Gun control advocates and the Mexican government have ex-
pressed support for another FAWB on certain firearms favored by
Mexican drug cartels. For instance, in May 2010, President Calde-
r6n called on Congress to restore the assault weapons ban to stem
the flow of these weapons to Mexico.' 53 Speaking for thirty-five min-
utes before a joint session of Congress, President Calder6n decried
the drug trafficking-fueled violence and noted, "We have seized
75,000 guns and assault weapons in Mexico in the past three years,
and more than 80 percent of those we have been able to trace come
from the United States."'154 He further noted the strong correlation
between the increase in violence by drug trafficking organizations
and the expiration of the FAWB.155
Mexico's Secretary of the Interior, Alejandro Poire Romero, re-
cently reiterated the position of President Calder6n on imposing
another FAWB.156 Secretary Poire Romero noted that in 2005, ap-
proximately one-third of the firearms seized in Mexico were assault
weapons.157 But this number has increased dramatically, and now
accounts for approximately 60 to 65 percent of the guns seized by
151. Id. at 1-2. I am aware, of course, of such violent tragedies as the Aurora Dark Knight
Rises shooting in July 2012, but the use of assault rifles in normal street crime is generally
incredibly low. See Who Has Illegal Guns and How Are They Acquired?, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE
(June 25, 2008), http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/crime/gun-violence/aquired.htm. Semi-au-
tomatic handguns are usually the weapon of choice for street thugs, armed robber, and the
like. See Gun Violence, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.nij.gov/topics/
crime/gun-violence/welcome.htm ("Most murders in the United States are committed with
firearms, especially handguns.").
152. See supra note 16. Unlike the average domestic street thug, Mexican DTOs prefer
assault rifles and their ilk for their drug trafficking activities. Id.
153. Brian Knowlton, Calderrn Calls for Restoring Assault Weapons Ban, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2010, 12:43 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/calderon-calls-for-
restoring-assault-weapons-ban/.
154. Id. Other reports back up this figure. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 7, at 15.
155. Knowlton, supra note 153. Of course, it is clear that violence increased dramatically
after President Calder6n took office and declared open war on the cartels, in conjunction
with the severe destabilization of several cartels. SEELKE, supra note 3, at 5-6.





FALL 2012] The Nonexistent U.S. Firearms Trafficking Statute
Mexican authorities.1 58 According to Poire Romero, "The signifi-
cant rise in violence and the increase in the number of public offi-
cials killed in Mexico [coincide] with [the] lifting of the assault
weapons ban."' 59 The empirical studies described above appear to
substantiate those statements.
Although the Calder6n presidency stressed in public its fight
against the cartels, it remains to be seen how the new Mexican pres-
idential administration, led by Enrique Pena Nieto, will fare. 160
President-elect Pena Nieto's election, previously mired in allega-
tions of vote buying and calls for a recount, 61 may signal a shift in
attitude and policy relating to the Mexican government's interac-
tion with the cartels. 162 The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
President-elect has indicated his willingness to continue to fight the
cartels but has also stated an interest in "stabilization of the situa-
tion in Mexico and advancement on many of the issues Americans
care about. ' 163 While President-elect Pena Nieto has announced his
willingness to continue Mexico's fight against the cartels, only time




160. Catherine E. Shoichet, Officials: Pena Nieto Projected Winner in Mexican Presidential Vote,
CNN (July 2, 2012, 1:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/O7/01/world/ainericas/mexico-
election/index.htrl.
161. Nick Miroff & William Booth, Mexico's Presidential Election Tainted by Claims of Vote
Buying, WASH. POST, July 4, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mexicos-
presidential-election-tainted-by-claims-of-vote-buying/2012/07/04/gJQAHqTzNWstory
.html; SEELKE, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the parties have since pledged to abide by the
Federal Electoral Tribunal's decision that certified the results of the election).
162. Indeed, one commentator noted President-elect Pena Nieto's engagement with big
business in Mexico, stating "[t] he hope of the entrepreneurs in Mexico is that Pena-Nieto, as
past PRI administrations have done, will put together a deal with the drug cartels, allowing
the violence to stop. Of course, if this happens, the corruption of the state could increase."
Beatriz Schiava, Mexican Elections, PPJ Entrepreneurs, and the Power Behind Pena Nieto, EXAMINER
.COM (July 29, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/mexican-elections-pri-
entrepreneurs-and-the-power-behind-pe-a-nieto. Indeed, the official line from the President-
elect is that he will seek to quickly reduce violence. Margaret Warner, Where Frontrunner Pena
Nieto Might Take Mexico's Drug War, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 28, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/06/mexico-dispatch-6.html (providing commentary
from Pena Nieto's campaign manager, Luis Videgaray, that Pena Nieto will "very quickly
prioritize reducing violence... [because if not,] we as a country are endangering the social
support for fighting crime"). The same piece notes, however, that Pena Nieto will not do
what other former PRI governors did and buy off the cartels. See id.
163. William Booth, Enrique Pena Nieto to Fight Cartels, THE Apiz. REPUB., July 2, 2012,
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2012/07/02/2020702mexico-
president-winner-pena-nieto-to-fight-cartels.html.
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III. EXAMINING THE ATF's OPERATIONS AND ITS CHALLENGES
Given the lack of support for a FAWB in the current climate, and
the difficulties with prosecuting actual "firearms trafficking" due to
the nature of the statute (including the "engaged in the business"
prong) U.S. law enforcement efforts have not adequately curtailed
the trafficking of firearms contributing to drug violence in Mexico.
Furthermore, the ATF has created an uproar with operations in-
tended to curtail firearms trafficking. To explain part of the investi-
gative debacle caused by the ATF, this section examines the context
of the ATF's operations, then discusses typical investigative tech-
niques that the ATF failed to use.
A. Project Gunrunner and Operation Fast and Furious
Project Gunrunner and Operation Fast and Furious failed to use
many typical investigative techniques, ultimately resulting in
"gunwalking." Although the ATF sought to push the envelope with
Operation Fast and Furious in firearms trafficking prosecution, it
clearly suffered from a lack of thoughtful' 64 supervision on the one
hand and the lack of a simple/straightforward firearms trafficking
statute on the other.
1. Targeting Firearms Traffickers: Project Gunrunner
From fall 2009 until early 2011, the ATF carried out an extensive
firearms sting operation designed to ensnare Mexican drug cartels
engaging in firearms trafficking into Mexico. 65 As previously dis-
cussed, several narco-trafficking cartels in Mexico perpetrate high
levels of violence against Mexican citizens, law enforcement, and
rival cartels or gangs. And since 2006, the drug violence carried out
by these cartels has increased dramatically. One reason for this
heightened violence is that the United States' prosecution of the
Arellano-Felix brothers (the de facto heads of the Tijuana cartel)
created a power vacuum in the drug trafficking routes of several
cartels. 166 And it appears that the increased availability of long
164. A number of accusations and concerns have been made on both sides regarding the
supervision, both by the ATF and the DOJ, of Operation Fast and Furious. See supra note 23.
165. Fred Lucas, Gun-Running Timeline: How DOJ's 'Operation Fast and Furious' Unfolded,
CNSNEWS.COM (July 7, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/gun-running-timeline-
how-doj-s-operation.
166. 10 Years After Prison Escape, "El Chapo" Thrives, CBSNEws (Jan. 18, 2011, 4:32 PM),
http://wwvw.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/18/world/main7258730.shtml (quoting U.S.
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guns-the weapon of choice among violent cartels-may have con-
tributed to the drug violence.
167
Project Gunrunner, which helped to fund Operation Fast and
Furious, began as a pilot program in Laredo, Texas and expanded
nationally in 2006.168 It sought to "help combat firearms trafficking
into Mexico" and to broadly "reduce cross-border drug and fire-
arms trafficking and the high level of violence associated with these
activities on both sides of the border.' 69 Gunrunner had four com-
ponents: "the expansion of gun tracing in Mexico, international
coordination, domestic activities, and intelligence." It targeted four
border ATF field divisions in the American Southwest.
1 70
The initiative set five main objectives, including investigation of
persons engaging in illicit firearms trafficking along the border and
coordination with Mexican law enforcement in these firearms
cases.1 71 Intending to concentrate resources among the four South-
west border field divisions, Project Gunrunner's "primary enforce-
ment initiative [was] to stem the trafficking of illegal weapons
across the U.S. border into Mexico and to reduce gun-driven vio-
lence on both sides of the border.' l7 2  The ATF received
approximately $21.9 million in 2009 and $37.5 million in 2010 for
Project Gunrunner operations, and ATF special agents on the pro-
ject increased from eighty-four to 224.173
Despite the funding and agent increases, the number of large
firearms trafficking cases did not grow. In fact, Project Gunrunner
focused mostly on gun dealer inspections and straw purchaser in-
vestigations rather than on "higher-level traffickers, smugglers and
the ultimate recipients of the trafficked guns.' 7 4 During Project
Gunrunner, the ATF increased the number of gun traces submitted
from Mexico, the number of cases referred for prosecution, and
Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin as saying, "The virtual destruc-
tion of the Arellano Felix cartel has opened a vacuum, which is being exploited by the Sina-
loa cartel and Chapo Guzman, who is arguably and provably the largest, most powerful
organized crime head in Mexico.").
167. VIOLENCE POLICY CmR., supra note 10.
168. OFFICE OF INSPECIOR GEN., supra note 19, at i.
169. Id.
170. Id. ATF is divided into twenty-six "field divisions." Field Divisions, ATF.cov, http://
wwwatf.gov/field/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). For instance, the Los Angeles Field Division
ranges from San Diego and Imperial County (very southern California) to Los Angeles, Ven-
tura, and counties in between. Los Angeles Field Division, ATF.Cov, http://www.atf.gov/field/
losangeles/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
171. OFFICE OF INSPECrOR GEN., supra note 19, at 2.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at v, 93-94; see also MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM,
FATALLY FLAWED, supra note 22, at 11-12.
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the number of compliance checks on Federal Firearms Licensees
(FFLs). 175 These cases, however, "mostly involve[d] straw purchas-
ers and corrupt gun dealers, not those who organize and command
the trafficking operations." 76 A thorough review of Project Gunrun-
ner by the DOJ Inspector General included a recommendation that
the ATF "[flocus on developing more complex conspiracy cases
against high level gun traffickers and gun trafficking conspira-
tors."' 77 Although it noted the lack of an effective U.S. firearms traf-
ficking statute, the Inspector General's analysis of Project
Gunrunner did not include any recommendations for further fire-
arms trafficking legislation. 178 While Project Gunrunner seemed to
head in the right direction-toward targeting important aspects of
firearms trafficking to Mexico-it suffered from a lack of coordi-
nated strategy and legislative assistance.
17 9
2. The Road to Hell Paved with Good Intentions: Operation Fast
and Furious
With Project Gunrunner in effect, the ATF sought to expand its
operations and snare higher-level gun traffickers to hurt the Mexi-
can drug cartels. Operation Fast and Furious appeared to be the
answer. It developed out of an ATF proposal in the fall of 2009.
Following a three-day training session in August 2009 entitled
"Southwest Border Firearms Trafficking Training,"'' 10 the Arizona
ATF and U.S. Attorney's Office took the materials from that train-
ing and began planning Operation Fast and Furious in September
of that year.' 18
175. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at 23, 26 (noting a 109 percent increase in
gun investigations, and a 54 percent increase in the number of cases referred for prosecution
upon implementation of Project Gunrunner).
176. Id. at 51-54.
177. Id. at 52-54, 95.
178. It did, however, include a recommendation that the DOJ and ATF "explore options
for seeking a requirement for reporting multiple sales of long guns." Id. at 94. Such a recom-
mendation would require a legislative solution.
179. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25, at 17, 106-208 (outlining Fast and
Furious in great detail, noting the lack of coordination between agencies and the lack of a
firearms trafficking statute).
180. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTiCE, Southwest Border Firearms Trafficking Training, Overview of
Straw Purchases, Aug. 4-7, 2009 (on file with author). The DOJ held this conference at the
National Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina. I attended this event, and the train-
ing materials are in my office.
181. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25, at 103.
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The operation sought to target gun traffickers by allowing guns
to move up the chain. 1 2 Normally, the ATF's modus operandi is to
find a straw purchaser and charge that straw purchaser, but this
method fails to capture and prosecute the individuals who actually
receive the firearms. In Fast and Furious, the ATF and DOJ prosecu-
tors183 made the specific decision to allow guns to "walk" farther
than they had in the past. In other words, ATF agents would not
immediately stop and arrest a person they believed purchased guns
for another person. 18 4 Instead, they would sit back and wait until
that "straw purchaser" delivered the guns to the intended recipient,
or even allow these guns to move further up the chain.
18 5
Fast and Furious used confidential informants, undercover
agents, wiretaps, surveillance, and a host of other law enforcement
tactics to investigate southbound firearms trafficking.18 6 ATF agents
further engaged actual licensed firearms dealers and allowed them
to sell guns to straw purchasers to continue the operation. 18 7 At
times, agents placed jury-rigged Global Positioning System (GPS)
devices on or within the guns so they could keep track of the weap-
ons' whereabouts. 18 8 Unfortunately, given the makeshift nature of
these devices, a number of them failed. 89
Ultimately, approximately two thousand firearms traveled from
the United States to Mexico during Operation Fast and Furious. 190
182. Id. at 113 (noting the desire to "actively identif[y] much larger players in the
organization").
183. There is a disagreement as to whether the "gunwalking" component of Fast and
Furious was decided by the prosecutors or the agents. Indeed, ATF agents claim that the
Assistant U.S. Attorney running the operation, Emory Hurley, told agents to stand down in
certain cases when agents were about to stop and arrest certain individuals. JOINT STAFFS OF
H. COMM. ON OVwRsIGTrr & GOV'T REFORM & S. COMM. ON THEJUDIcIARY, FAST AND FURIOUS:
ANATOMY OF A FAILED OPEeATION 56, 114-19 (2012), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ 7-31-12-FF-Part--FINAL-REPORT.pdf. In this author's experi-
ence, an AUSA does not generally have such wide and vast operational control. But that is
likely a subject for another article. See Stewart M. Young, Agents and Prosecutors and Judges, Oh
My! Operational Controls for Proactive Criminal Investigations (discussing the controls on investi-
gations and arguing about potential line-drawing between allowing prosecutors to control a
criminal investigation and allowing a law enforcement agent to control the investigation)
(work in progress on file with author).
184. JOINT STAFFS, Accou'rs OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 18-35 (describing
Gunwalking and various accounts of agents being required to not immediately interdict
guns).
185. Id.
186. SeeJoNT STAFFS, AccouN'rs OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 4-5.
187. Id.
188. Why Operation Fast and Furious Failed, NPR.oRc, (une 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/2012/06/21/155513757/why-operation-fast-and-furious-failed (detailing how
agents placed GPS devices on some of the guns, but that the batteries ran out).
189. Id.
190. JOINT STAFFS, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 16 (indicating that over
1,900 guns likely entered into Mexico during the operation).
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Rather than interdict these weapons either in transit or at the bor-
der, the ATF allowed the guns to "walk" and end up in the hands of
cartel members.1tu Often these weapons showed up at crime scenes
in Mexico and several appeared at a Border Patrol agent's murder
scene in Arizona. 192 The ATF and the DOJ (especially the Assistant
U.S. Attorney) specifically sought not to interdict these weapons at
an early stage so as to create a larger trafficking case. 9 3 While the
sentiment might have been honorable (i.e., to target firearms traf-
ficking on a larger scale), 194 the execution of Fast and Furious was
extremely poor. 19
5
3. The Resulting Disaster
The ATF touted the success of Operation Fast and Furious in
numerous fact sheets and press releases over time. But those "suc-
cesses" failed to account for the devastating results: approximately
two thousand guns "walked" down to Mexico through the operation
with the Mexican government none the wiser.' 96 Moreover, Mexi-
can law enforcement recovered three 197 of the weapons from Fast
and Furious at the scene of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry's mur-
der on December 14, 2010. While it is not clear whether any of
those weapons were actually used to kill Agent Terry, the ramifica-
tions of those weapons' presence at the crime scene are obvious. So
obvious, in fact, that the Congressional House Committee on Over-
sight and Government Reform began investigating links between
that incident and Operation Fast and Furious. 98
191. JoINr STAFFS, ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 30-35
192. Id. at 6, 35-38, 43-46; JoiN STrArs, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, SUpra note 23, at
8-14 (detailing in a chart numerous weapons traced to Fast and Furious recovered at Mexi-
can crimes scenes).
193. Id. at 5-6, 30-32.
194. The Washington Post's editorial board called the operation a "well-intentioned, mis-
guided response to-and not the cause of-the proliferation of illegal guns in Mexico."
Supra note 194.
195. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25, at 419-31.
196. JOINT STAFFS, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 27-28 ("ATF and DOJ
leadership kept their own personnel in Mexico and Mexican government officials totally in
the dark about all aspects of Fast and Furious.").
197. Previously, only two weapons were linked. But it appears that a third weapon found
at the scene has now been linked to Fast and Furious. See William Lajeunesse, Third Gun
Linked to 'Fast and Furious' Identified at Border Agent's Murder Scene, FoxNEWS (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/09/exclusive-third-gun-linked-to-fast-and-
furious-identified-at-border-agents/.
198. SeeJoiNT STAFFS, ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGEN-TS, supra note 23; Jor STAFFS, FUELING
CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23.
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The fallout from Operation Fast and Furious continues. On Au-
gust 30, 2011, the DOJ reassigned Acting ATF Director Kenneth
Melson to a post as "senior advisor on forensic science in the De-
partment of Justice's Office of Legal Programs."'' 99 The U.S. Attor-
ney for the District of Arizona, Dennis Burke, was "also a casualty in
the shakeup tied to the botched gun-running program."200 Other
ATF agents received promotions or transfers, and the Assistant U.S.
Attorney (AUSA) assigned to run the day-to-day operations of the
case, Emory Hurley, was transferred from the criminal division to
the civil division in his office.
20 1
B. Typical Investigative Operations
Despite the problems discussed in the sections above, the ATF
and the DOJ still possess methods to investigate and prosecute fire-
arms offenses in a more limited context. Several commentators, in-
cluding Congressman Darrell Issa, have already argued that the
ATF did not take appropriate investigatory actions during its opera-
tions, thereby endangering lives in both Mexico and the United
States.202 And the ATF and the DOJ did not use a number of investi-
gatory techniques and methods at their disposal to ferret out
firearms violations and gather evidence for prosecution under the
admittedly weak firearms trafficking statute. In a typical gun traf-
ficking investigation, ATF agents have a wide variety of techniques
to gather prosecutorial evidence against traffickers. A number of
these investigatory techniques are addressed briefly below.
199. William Lajeunesse, A TE Director Reassigned; U.S. Attorney Out Amid 'Fast and Furious'
Uproar, FoxNEws (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/30/sources-
atf-director-to-be-reassigned-amid-fast-and-furious-uproar/.
200. Id. Burke apparently became physically ill during questioning and could not con-
tinue his session with congressional investigators. Id.
201. Id. Some (mainly civil litigators) might claim that this is a promotion, but most crim-
inal prosecutors would not view it as such-at least not any of the ones that I know. See also
Jerry Markon & Sari Horwitz, ATF Head Kenneth Melson Reassigned in Shakeup Following Gun-
Trafficking Probe, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/af-
head-kenneth-melson-reassigned-amid-gun-trafficking-probe/2011/08/30/gIQAjALppJ_
story.html.
202. JOINT STAFFS, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23; JoINT STAFFS, ACCOUNTS OF
ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 14-18. The majority report of the Congressional Committee
discusses various operational tactics not undertaken during the ATF investigation that may
have led to numerous firearms traveling to Mexico (including the aforementioned three
firearms recovered at Agent Terry's murder scene). JOINT STAFFs, AccouNTS OF ATF ACENTS,
supra note 23 at 14-18.
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1. Brief Investigatory Stops (Terry Stops)
ATF agents have clear authority to conduct brief investigatory
stops of persons or vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.2 0 3 ATF
agents can also briefly detain people and seize vehicles once the
agents have reasonable suspicion that the subjects are trafficking or
carrying firearms. 2 4 Often, agents will stop a person or vehicle
based on reasonable suspicion and will conduct a swift investigation
that dispels such suspicion, thereby allowing the target to go on his
or her way. In this manner, agents are able to identify individuals
using driver's licenses or other methods, 2 0 5 and may place GPS
trackers on vehicles for surveillance purposes.2 6 These brief Terry
stops (named for the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio)
allow agents to gather information and continue their investigation,
even if the stops do not result in a seizure of firearms or arrests of
targets. As noted above, the case agents and the prosecutor in Op-
eration Fast and Furious refused to allow agents to conduct these
brief investigatory stops for information gathering. These brief in-
vestigatory stops do not have to be punitive in nature and, if done
right, will not tip off the traffickers that they are being investigated
(especially if done far from the gun-buy).
203. The original case for this proposition is Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968). With reason-
able suspicion, which is defined as more than a hunch (but not much more), an officer may
temporarily detain a person he or she believes is engaged in criminal conduct and may de-
tain them only for the period of time that it takes to dispel that reasonable suspicion. Id. at
27.
204. Reasonable suspicion allows for a brief Terry stop and allows for further investigation
to dispel that reasonable suspicion. Id. at 27, 28-30.
205. While agents may have identified a number of the traffickers, it is not unusual for
agents not to know all of the individuals in a certain car. Thus, the brief investigatory stop
allows agents to identify all the persons in a car, in the guise of a quick traffic stop, and agents
can use this information to further their investigation.
206. Of course, the specific use of these GPS trackers is in doubt after the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The constitutionality of GPS
tracker use was argued in Jones before the Supreme Court on November 8, 2011. At that time,
there was a circuit split regarding the constitutionality of the use of slap-on trackers (trackers
that do not invade the automobile-those are known as "hard-wired" trackers) in the public
sphere. The Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, recently ruled that the use of GPS track-
ers placed on a publicly accessible part of the automobile (and placed while the automobile
is publicly accessible) was not a violation of a person's expectation of privacy and therefore
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212,
1216-17 (2010). But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-65, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that GPS tracking require a court-approved warrant).
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2. Wall Stops
Another investigative technique that dovetails with Terry stops is a
"wall stop."20 7 A wall stop occurs when a vehicle or person is
stopped based on a criminal offense or moving violation, wherein
the agent actually has reason to believe that other criminal activity
is occurring.2 8 The best example of a wall stop occurs during a Ti-
tle III or state-equivalent wiretap investigation. Using the Title III
wiretap information, an agent will garner probable cause that a ve-
hicle or person is carrying narcotics (or some other Title 111-ap-
proved contraband) and will contact a law enforcement official not
connected with the investigation (usually state or local law enforce-
ment-often highway patrol). °'- The agent will request the local
law enforcement official to locate the vehicle (or will provide loca-
tional information for that vehicle) and request the official to stop
the vehicle once he or she develops independent probable cause
for the stop.210 During the stop, the official will conduct a normal
traffic stop and will usually find a basis for probable cause for a
vehicle search.
2 1'
Through a properly conducted wall stop, agents are generally
able to conceal an ongoing investigation. As noted below, it appears
that the ATF and the DOJ were so concerned with operational se-
curity that they did not inform the ATF's attach6 in Mexico about
the operation.21 2 Generally, wall stops allow investigations and even
actual prosecutions to go forward without revealing the overall in-
vestigation (as long as there is a true wall set up between the law
207. This is also known as a "walled off' stop. United States v. Covarrubias, 302 Fed.
Appx. 702, 703, 2008 WL 5112147 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Covarrubias, No. 06-CR-
116-BR, 2007 WL 30275, at *1 (D. Or. 2007); see a/so United Statesv. Pedraza-Bucio, No. 2:08-
CR-698(TC), 2009 WL 1110332, at *1 n.1 (D. Ut. 2009) ("Although a 'wall stop' is based on a
legitimate traffic violation, it is motivated by the underlying belief that some sort of contra-
band is likely located in the car."); KEN WALLENTINE, STREET LEGAL: A GUIDE TO PRE-TRIAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENDERS 61 (2007) ("The term 'wall
stop' is based on the theory that there is a wall between the stopping officers and the investi-
gators who give the tip to the stopping officers. Essentially, the investigators have 'handed
off the information to the stopping officers.").
208. WALLENTINE, supra note 207, at 61.
209. Id.
210. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), provides the axiom that the officer's
subjective motivations are generally not taken into account as long as the officer is not con-
ducting racial profiling; as long as the initial stop was legitimate, based on a traffic violation
or other legitimate reason, the actual motivations of the officer involved generally will not be
considered.
211. Invariably, wall stops work well only if the local law enforcement official has a nar-
cotic detector dog (NDD) handy or close by. Once a NDD indicates that a vehicle contains
illegal drugs, there is probable cause to search (albeit with some caveats).
212. JOINT STArEs, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 27-33.
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enforcement agencies involved, and generally as long as the prose-
cutors involved are not part of the same organization). 213 Using wall
stops would have enabled agents to continue to conduct their inves-
tigation in Operation Fast and Furious while having at least some
defendants prosecuted on the state side. This approach also would
have preserved the opportunity to have those persons ultimately
wrapped up into the federal case after the ATF took down the
operation.
3. Border Stops
The lack of border stops in Operation Fast and Furious is proba-
bly one of the most glaring and surprising failures of the ATF and
DOJ. Generally, any vehicle or person coming into the United
States is subject to search in accordance with long-standing border
search doctrine and precedent 2 14 Outbound border checkpoints
and searches are generally allowed as well, although those are sub-
ject to more scrutiny to ensure that they comply with relevant con-
stitutional provisions.2 15 All firearms that are not legally exported to
Mexico are contraband, and anyone carrying unauthorized
firearms into Mexico commits a crime under Mexican law.2 16 There-
fore, as long as a vehicle has been stopped in conjunction with bor-
der search doctrine, and firearms are found, those firearms may be
seized by law enforcement.
217
In Fast and Furious, ATF agents might have requested Customs
and Border Protection and Border Patrol to set up outbound bor-
der checkpoints upon their belief that purchased firearms were
213. WALLENTINE, supra note 207, at 61.
214. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1972) (discussing the longstanding
border search doctrine).
215. See Stewart M. Young, The (Un)Constitutionality of Outgoing Border Stops and Searches
(working paper) (on file with author) (arguing that, subject to certain criteria, outbound
border stops and searches are unconstitutional, but noting also the conditions that must be
in place for these stops and searches to comport with constitutional protections).
216. Guns Are Illegal in Mexico, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TUIANA CONSULATE, http://tijuana.us
consulate.gov/tijuana/warning.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
217. There are remedies to this seizure; the federal government generally indicts the
firearms and subjects them to court proceedings and forfeiture, which anyone who has as-
serted a property interest may contest. In the many years of firearms seizure at the border,
however, there has not been a single case of anyone contesting the seizure of such weapons.
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heading to Mexico. The vast majority of firearms trafficking gener-
ally occurs at ports of entry, whereas drug and alien smuggling oc-
cur both at and in between ports of entry.21 8 Therefore, instituting
southbound border checkpoints at these ports of entry to target rel-
evant vehicles would have likely yielded the contraband firearms.
It is important to note that even when contraband firearms are
found on target individuals, agents and prosecutors do not need to
immediately indict these individuals and end the investigation.
Rather, just seizing and forfeiting the firearms at the border check-
point and documenting the driver and occupants would have suf-
ficed, and the investigation could have continued. Indeed,
repeatedly using this technique would have uncovered the firearms,
preventing them from traveling to Mexico while providing a gold
mine of information for the investigation. Given that the ATF
agents ran a wiretap during the investigation, they likely could have
learned more information from the calls made after the firearms
seizures and used this information to expand their target ring.2 19 In
any event, with the use of outbound border searches and seizures,
the ATF and the DOJ might have thwarted large numbers of fire-
arms crossing the border while continuing to keep their investiga-
tion intact.
4. Lures
All of the techniques described above are helpful for gathering
evidence. But what techniques are available for securing targets
who are not within the United States? Extraditions are an approved
technique, 220 and the Mexican government now allows extradition
in much greater numbers than in the past.221 While extradition is
218. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SOUTHWEST BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS STRAT-
EGY IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 8, 10, 21-23 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and research/swb.implementationlO_.pdf.
219. I recognize the rejoinder to this argument, which is that the border seizures, if done
often, might cause the target individuals to "drop" their phones. Once the phones are
dropped, the wiretap would be useless until the ATF agents identified new phones used by
the targets and developed new probable cause to tap those phones. Such an argument neces-
sitates the development and increased use of roving wiretaps, a rarely discussed law enforce-
ment tool. SeeYoung, Targeting the Person, supra note 73 (arguing that, with a few changes of
the Title III statute, roving wiretaps should be much more widely used given the increased
ability and awareness of criminals to thwart electronic surveillance).
220. See U.S. DEP'T oFJUsTICE, UNITED STATES Ai-roRNEvs' MANUAL § 9-15.000, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-_:room/usam/tite9/ 1 5mcrm.htm#9-1 5.0
00 (outlining the method, paperwork, and other parameters of extradition).
221. SEELKE, supra note 3, at 16-18,
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generally approved, it can often take a long time because of the
Mexican court system and other bureaucratic red tape.
Lures are a DOJ-approved method of bringing potential defend-
ants and co-conspirators from a foreign country into the United
States. 222 One might say that lures are the little brother of extradi-
tions, but they are generally cheaper and faster (and often yield
better results) than extraditions. Generally, a lure is a subterfuge
inviting a target to leave the foreign country where he resides and
travel to the United States or a third country that allows extradition
to the United States. The U.S. Attorney's Manual describes a lure as
something as simple as inviting a target defendant by telephone to
come and attend a party in the United States.2 23 Sometimes a lure
may involve the use of confidential informants, who often provide
the target defendant with falsified documents to enable the target
to travel to the United States and be apprehended at the border.224
Once someone is within the jurisdiction of the United States, ATF
agents may then arrest the person for their firearms trafficking
activities.
The techniques described above could have helped to stem the
flow of firearms into Mexico while preserving the investigation. The
ATF, however, never chose to use them in Operation Fast and
Furious.
C. Clear Issues Resulting from the Operation
One might argue that Operation Fast and Furious had the poten-
tial to decrease firearms trafficking in the Southwest. Before initiat-
ing this operation, ATF agents identified a number of straw
purchasers involved in firearms trafficking.22 5 Indeed, once the op-
eration concluded soon after Border Patrol Agent Terry's tragic
death, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Arizona announced five indict-
ments against persons accused of engaging in straw purchases to
222. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, supra note 220, at § 9-15.630. In the interest of full disclo-
sure, I was party to a number of lures for target defendants. They were quite fun, actually.
Lures are generally not used on low-level targets but focus on much higher-level defendants.
Planning a lure that involves a defendant coming into the United States for a party, the
lottery, or even with a fake visa or false travel documents requires many levels of the DOJ to
sign off, but the payoff is quite good when the defendant realizes what has happened.
223. Id.
224. Given the DOJ's role in such a lure, the DOJ would never prosecute someone for use
of the fake documents that brought that person into the country. Clearly, that would add
insult to injury.
225. JoINT STAFFS, AccouNTs OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23, at 5, 25, 44.
[VOL. 46:1
The Nonexistent U.S. Firearms Trafficking Statute
buy hundreds of weapons.2 6 The main indictment, the "Avila
indictment," included thirty-four counts of "false statements in con-
nection with the acquisition of firearms," which constituted the
straw purchaser counts of the indictment.2 7 After a year of running
an operation and the sale of approximately two thousand firearms,
the U.S. Attorney's Office essentially prosecuted only straw purchas-
ers-albeit a number of them-and did not prosecute or otherwise
disrupt a major firearms trafficking organization. 228 Given the weak-
ness of the federal firearms trafficking statute, one might argue that
the ATF and the DOJ constructed the best case they could under
the existing framework. This incident demonstrates the inherent
problem with that framework and shows why calls for a more robust
firearms trafficking statute are appropriate.
The section above demonstrates that there are a number of in-
vestigative tactics that can bear fruit when investigating firearms vio-
lations, but also that these operational techniques do not alleviate
the lack of a true firearms trafficking statute. Engaging in
investigative techniques that provide evidence of firearms violations
is useful, but without the actual statute to charge all of the players
in a conspiracy, all is for naught. Operation Fast and Furious was
not what it could have been had approved investigative techniques
been used, but the lack of a firearms trafficking statute also created
additional problems by forcing the ATF to haphazardly cobble to-
gether firearms charges. If the ATF and the DOJ actually had a stat-
ute that criminalized true firearms trafficking, 2 9 their operations
(and the extraterritorial effects of those operations) would have
made it more likely that firearms violations were detected and pros-
ecuted. I address a more comprehensive framework for this statute
below.
226. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Arizona, Grand Juries
Indict 34 Suspects in Drug Firearms Trafficking Organization (Jan. 25, 2011) available at http:
//www.justice.gov/usao/az/press-releases/201 1/PR 01 25201 lPress%20Conference.pdf.;
Zagaris, supra note 2.
227. Indictment at 1-43, United States v. Avila, No. CR-1 1-126-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz.Jan. 19,
2011), available at www.justice.gov/usao/az/press-releases/2011/US-vAvilaIndictment
.pdf.
228. SeeJOINT STAFFS, supra note 183, at 20 ("[Mlerely seizing firearms through interdic-
tion will not stop firearms trafficking to Mexico. We must identify, investigate, and eliminate
the sources of illegally trafficked firearms and the networks that transport them.") (discuss-
ing the new strategy at the Department of Justice) (footnote omitted).
229. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25, at 17 ("There is no federal statute specifi-
cally prohibiting firearms trafficking or straw purchasing. Instead, these activities are investi-
gated by agents and charged by prosecutors using a variety of criminal statutes depending on
the circumstances of each particular case."); OFFICE OF INSPECrOR GEN., supra note 19, at vi
(providing the same description).
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V. REFINING OR REDEFINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FIREARMS
PROSECUTIONS
On March 3, 2011, President Barack Obama spoke at a joint
press conference with Mexican President Felipe Calder6n. At that
press conference, President Obama highlighted the United States'
responsibility to help prevent drug violence in Mexico and men-
tioned U.S. law enforcement actions to prevent such violence:
I reiterated that the United States accepts our shared responsi-
bility for the drug violence, So to combat the southbound flow
of guns and money, we are screening all southbound rail
cargo, seizing many more guns bound for Mexico, and we are
putting more gunrunners behind bars .... We are very mind-
ful that the battle President Calder6n is fighting inside of Mex-
ico is not just his battle; it's also ours. We have to take
responsibility just as he's taking responsibility.
2 30
Clearly, the Obama Administration, like the George W. Bush Ad-
ministration, recognizes the problems inherent in southbound fire-
arms trafficking. To that end, President Obama's assertion that "we
are putting more gunrunners behind bars" is a clarion call. The
Obama Administration's recent "Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime" notes the importance of stopping the flow of
weapons and cash to transnational criminal networks. 231 That strat-
egy document touts an "increased emphasis on stemming these out-
bound flows" of weapons and cash. 2 It also provides for the
deployment of "outbound teams" within U.S. Customs and Border
Protection that screen outbound vehicle traffic for weapons and
bulk cash shipments, and directs greater resources toward "inte-
grated Border Enforcement Security Task Forces" to investigate
cross-border crimes.233 Furthermore, the Strategy states, "We will
also work with Congress to seek ratification or accession to key mul-
tilateral instruments related to countering the illicit trafficking of
weapons." 234 What is missing from this July 2011 publication is any
discussion of implementing a useful and effective domestic firearms
230. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SR rEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 15
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trafficking statute-something that would significantly help in com-
bating gunrunning and the rush of firearms traveling southbound
to Mexican drug cartels. 35
A. An Actual "Firearms Trafficking" Statute
Discussions among academics and policy experts who focus on
firearms and firearms trafficking have generally been silent on the
currently impotent firearms trafficking statute 23 6 and on the posi-
tive extraterritorial effects on curbing drug violence that an effec-
tive statute would engender. Firearms trafficking from the United
States to Mexico does garner attention among legal scholars.
2 37
Mostly, however, gun control cases, such as District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, and manufacturer liability are
the current flavors of the day in scholarship focused on firearms
and firearms trafficking.2 38 A number of policy groups provide data
235. One might argue that the Strategy's statement that the Obama Administration will
"work with Congress" might indicate a desire to create an actual firearms trafficking statute
with meat. It is clear, however, that the Administration does not view this as a priority. One of
the proposed actions from the Strategy includes "[w] ork with Congress to secure ratification
of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Fire-
arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials." Id. at 16. Another related ac-
tion is "[sleek accession to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime." Id. Nothing is mentioned about strengthening
criminal firearms trafficking statutes domestically.
236. There have been calls for a "federal firearms trafficking statute" in the popular press
and in congressional hearings but none thus far in the legal academic literature. See, e.g.,
Statement by PeterJ. Forcelli, supra note 119; Editorial, supra note 156.
237. See Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1233 (2009); Benjamin Kai Miller,
Note, Fueling Violence Along the Southwest Border: What More Can Be Done to Protect the Citizens of
the United States and Mexico from Firearms, 32 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 163 (2009); see also Anthony A.
Braga & David M. Kennedy, Gunshows and the Illegal Diversion of Firearms, 6 GEo. PUB. POL'Y
Rlv. 7 (2000) (discussing the flow of illegal guns); Phillip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Com-
prehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43
Amiz. L. REv. 277 (2001) (discussing the use of firearms tracing in criminal investigations);
Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM. L. REv. 2333 (2003); Eric
Proshansky, The Movement of Illegal Guns in America Report, 217 PLI/CviM 387 (July 22, 2009)
(discussing gun tracing in American cities).
238. See, e.g., Dustin Bower, Guns Don't Kill People, Although 30,000 Americans Each Year
Would Disagree: An Analysis of Gun Manufacturer Liability, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y' 187
(2010); David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 79 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
823 (2011); Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and
Communities of Color, 25 HARv. BLAcKLET-rER L.J. 133 (2009); Jamal Greene, Heller High
Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'V REv. 325 (2009); Robert A. Levy, Second
Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Heller Paradox, 33 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y
203 (2010); Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There More?) in McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487 (2011); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment
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and lobby in support of effectively regulating firearms trafficking.239
When the subject of guns and Mexico arises, there are numerous
calls to use the Merida Initiative to curb the violence in Mexico.2 40
As noted previously, economic literature on firearms trafficking to
Mexico 241 and on firearms trafficking in general242 is also available.
Furthermore, there are also academic discussions relating to vio-
lence in Mexico and calls for drug law reform. 243 Despite all this
talk, there has been no discussion of the positive effects that would
occur if the United States government implemented a true firearms
trafficking statute to criminalize trafficking firearms to Mexico or
other countries.
1. Mirroring Drug Trafficking Statutes
What might a true firearms trafficking statute look like? First, it
would not include the "engaged in the business" prong of the ex-
isting statute. As discussed above, this prong has given courts insuf-
ficient guidance in applying the statute.2 44 And the prong is not
necessary. A look at the federal drug statutes, which are fairly self-
explanatory, reveals that they contain no equivalent prong, and that
they can serve as useful models for a firearms trafficking statute. 45
The following two statutes, which cover importation and distribu-
tion/possession with intent to distribute, make it a federal crime to
engage in virtually any activity involving illicit narcotics. 21 U.S.C.
§ 952 governs the importation of a controlled substance into the
Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. RV. 247 (2012); Brian J. Siebel, Gun
Jndwstiy Immunity: Why the Gun Industry's "Dirty Little Secret" Does Not Deserve Congressional Protec-
tion, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 911 (2005); Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, 6 DuvF J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 16 (2010). I have not done this footnote justice.
Indeed, a recent WestlawNext search revealed 684 law review citations for D.C. v. Heller and
167 law review citations for McDonald v. City of Chicago.
239. See, e.g., VIOLENCE POLICY Cm., supra note 10; VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., IRON RIVER:
GUN VIOLENCE & ILLEGAL FREARms TRAFFICKING ON THE U.S.-MExico BORDER (2009), available
at http://www.vpc.org/studies/ironriver.pdf.
240. See supra notes 54-56.
241. Dube et al., supra note 18.
242. Stefano DellaVigna & Eliana La Ferrara, Detecting Illegal Arms Trade, ECONOMETRICS
LAB. SovTwAREJ ARCHrvE, 1-4, 5-6, 26 (Dec. 2009), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/
-sdellavi/wp/weaponsDec09.pdf (proposing "a method to detect illegal arms trade based
on investor knowledge" that focuses on "countries under arms embargo" and determines
whether arms companies are trading arms illegally based on stock prices).
243. E.g., Hoskin, supra note 54.
244. See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
245. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (Prohibited Acts-Including Possession with Intent to Dis-
tribute), 952, 960 (Importation and Penalties) (2006).
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United States. For Schedule I and II controlled substances, it states
in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the
United States from any place outside thereof (but within the
United States), or to import into the United States from any
place outside thereof, any controlled substance in Schedule I
or II .... 246
A firearms trafficking statute, without the "engaged in the busi-
ness" portion, might look very similar: "It shall be unlawful to ex-
port outside of the customs territory of the United States from any
place inside thereof, any firearm." Much like the drug trafficking
statute,247 this would require an intent requirement, so as not to
create a strict liability crime. This statute would also need conspir-
acy and attempt provisions, since conspiracy to traffic in firearms
would likely target individuals more responsible2 4 for firearms traf-
ficking. Furthermore, there would need to be some kind of excep-
tion for lawful exporters, as well as licensed dealers, of firearms (the
legal traffickers).
This proposed statute has the advantages of being clean, straight-
forward, and fairly easy to apply. The gun lobby would oppose such
a statute, but it is hard to argue that criminalizing non-commercial
(and non-legitimate) exports of firearms would affect even a small
number of NRA members. Such a statute might worry those in-
volved in the legitimate business of exporting firearms, but a "legal
traffickers" exemption would alleviate such concern.
The second drug trafficking statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, may also be
an efficacious model for an effective firearms trafficking statute.
That statute reads in relevant part, "Except as authorized ... it shall
246. 21 U.S.C. § 952 (2006). 21 U.S.C. § 960 lays out the penalties for importation. See 21
U.S.C. § 960 (2006). This is why prosecutors use 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 to charge for
importation; the possession with intent to distribute statute, however, includes the penalties.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). Additionally, 21 U.S.C. § 953 (2006) governs the export of con-
trolled substances. It includes a host of exceptions, and therefore the importation statute is
simpler. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 953 (2006).
247. 21 U.S.C. § 952 (2006) does not list a mens rea requirement, but the case law re-
quires proof that a defendant knew or intended that the narcotics would be imported into
the United States. United States v. Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d 994, 997-1000 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 652-53 (1st Cir. 1990).
248. Or at least with more skin in the game in terms of paying for the weapons to be
trafficked down south to Mexico.
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be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance .... "249
A firearms trafficking statute could mirror this statute in relevant
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or
distribute, a firearm." There would need to be an exception for "le-
gal traffickers" in addition to the normal conspiracy and attempt
sections.
The NRA and other Second Amendment advocates would likely
raise concerns with this approach. The current firearms regime al-
lows for private parties, rather than just "legal traffickers," to sell
their firearms to anyone, within reason, without reporting those
sales. A statute that criminalizes the sale of such firearms for those
who are not "legal traffickers" would likely cause a firestorm of pub-
lic controversy. But even the current administration, already un-
popular with the NRA,250 would never go this far. Accordingly,
when considering drug trafficking statutes as a foundation for the
firearms trafficking statute, the importation statute, rather than the
distribution/possession with intent statute, would be the most polit-
ically feasible and practical option.
2. Extending the Statute Through a Focus on Trafficking by
Prohibited Persons
There is another approach on the horizon to amend the firearms
trafficking law to make it more effective. On July 14, 2011, Con-
gresswoman Carolyn Maloney introduced H.R. 2554, the "Stop Gun
Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011."251 Her
remarks on this bill discussed the drug violence in Mexico and con-
cerns over hamstrung law enforcement efforts to combat firearms
trafficking. 252 Congresswoman Maloney specifically noted the con-
cerns of law enforcement officials, expressed at House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee hearings (the Issa Hearings
249. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1) (2006).
250. Sean Lengell, NRA Official: Obama Wants to Outlaw Guns in 2nd Term, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/feb/10/nra-
official-obama-wants-outlaw-guns-2nd-term/; Clarence Page, Gun Lobby Fires Up Obama Fear;
NRA Targets President Despite His 'Pro-Gun' Record, CHI. T~aB., July 22, 2012, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2012-07-22/news/ct-oped-0722-page-20120722-1-anti-gun-president-
gun-show-loophole-nra-leaders.
251. See H.R 2554: Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011, Gov-
TRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2554 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
252. See Maloney, supra note 2.
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on Operation Fast and Furious), about including "a specific fire-
arms trafficking provision in the criminal code." 253 Given the ATF's
request for reports on multiple long rifle purchases and the Sen-
tencing Commission's proposal for stiffer penalties on straw pur-
chasers, Congresswoman Maloney and her co-sponsors sought to
enact a tougher firearms trafficking statute via H.R. 2554.254
H.R. 2554 would amend 18 U.S.C. § 932 of the firearms traffick-
ing statute.2 55 It reads:
§ 932. Trafficking in firearms
(a) In General-It shall be unlawful for any person, regard-
less of whether anything of value is exchanged, to re-
ceive, or to transfer or otherwise dispose of to 1 or more
individuals, 2 or more firearms that have been shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
conduct will result in the disposing of I or more fire-
arms to an individual-
(1) whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be
unlawful; or
(2) who intends to or will use, carry, possess, or dispose
of the firearm unlawfully.
256
The proposed bill also includes language describing "organizer"
and "conspiracy," and a definition section. 25 7 Finally, it provides se-
vere penalties for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 932, including a twenty-
year maximum for a violation and a twenty-five-year maximum for a
violation "in concert with 5 or more other persons" when that per-
son occupies a supervisory role.25 8 Alas, for a conspiracy violation,
the proposed legislation includes only a ten-year maximum pen-
alty,2 59 even though the conspiracy charge would likely be the most
useful for (and used by) ATF agents.
253. Id.; see also supra note 119,
254. Maloney, supra note 2.
255. Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act, H.R. 2554, 112th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-1 12hr2554ih/pdf/BILLS-
112hr2554ih.pdf.
256. Id.
257. Id. at section 2(a) (amending section 932 to add "(b) Organizer," "(c) Conspiracy,"
and "(d) Definitions").
258. Id. at section 2(b) (amending section 924(a) to include a twenty-year maximum pen-
alty and increasing the penalty for an organizer/supervisory role).
259. Id. at section 2(b) (amending section 924(a) to include a ten-year maximum penalty
for violation of section 932(c) (conspiracy)).
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Congresswoman Maloney's bill has merit and advances the dis-
cussion of meaningful regulation on international firearms traffick-
ing. It would criminalize the provision of firearms to persons that
should not have them. But it does not explicitly include a trans-
national element that would target the drug cartels seeking these
firearms and enhance the statute's deterrent effect.
The likely NRA argument against such a bill would proceed as
follows: The Second Amendment provides for the right to bear fire-
arms and therefore for the right to dispose of those firearms law-
fully. Criminalizing the transfer or distribution of firearms to
another person, and then penalizing the transferor based on the
transferee's intent, would be unfair. Moreover, the "intent or will to
use" requirement would likely be quite difficult for prosecutors to
prove. Unless the transferee explains his or her illegal purpose for
the weapon, and records that explanation, it will be difficult to
prosecute these crimes under § 932 (a) (2). And proof problems are
generally among the main barriers to effective prosecutions for fire-
arms violations.2 60
Ultimately, modeling the federal firearms trafficking statute after
the drug importation statute still has the most merit. The focus on
prohibited persons, while valid, does not enable prosecution to the
same degree as a focus on the transportation of firearms would.
While I appreciate Congressperson Maloney's approach that fo-
cuses on possession by prohibited persons, it appears easier to
prove a violation of how the firearms traveled, rather than to whom
those firearms traveled. Thus, I would still argue in favor of prohib-
iting the "type of travel" of the firearms as I advocate in the section
above, rather than favor the proposed legislation that prohibits who
receives the firearms.
3. Prosecuting Firearms Trafficking Under the Arms Export
Control Act and International Traffic in Arms
Regulations
The United States has also set up a regime for exporting defense
articles and for the prosecution of persons who export those de-
fense articles without authorization from the U.S. government. An
examination of the statute governing this regime, the Arms Export
260. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at 63-66.
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Control Act (AECA) provides an interesting corollary to the argu-
ments about the federal firearms trafficking statute. The AECA 261
lists a number of requirements for exporting and importing de-
fense articles and services.26 2 It falls under Tide 22 of the United
States Code, "Foreign Relations and Intercourse. '" 26 3 As such, it car-
ries criminal penalties, although it is not part of the United States
criminal code provisions set forth in either Title 18 (Crimes and
Criminal Procedure) 26 4 or Title 21 (Food and Drugs, including the
drug trafficking statutes). 265 The AECA requires export licenses for
certain defense articles and provides that "[d]ecisions on issuing
export licenses under this section shall take into account whether
the export or an article would contribute to an arms race, . ., sup-
port international terrorism, [or] increase the possibility or out-
break or escalation of conflict. ' 266 It further implemented the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of regula-
tions governing the export of defense articles. 267 Willful failure to
comply is subject to a twenty-year maximum sentence along with
the possibility of a one million dollar fine.2 68
ITAR mainly prohibits exporting certain defense articles and
technical data, as well as the brokering of defense articles by per-
sons in the United States and all U.S. persons abroad.2 69 The statute
and regulations generally target defense manufacturers and spies;
the State Department is charged with ensuring compliance with
AECA and administering ITAR.2 70 Generally, the articles that are
controlled are arms and munitions, rather than the small firearms
long favored by the Mexican drug cartels. 27 1 While small arms are
included on the munitions list, the sentencing guidelines are ex-
ceedingly low for offenses involving them (or involving fewer than
two firearms).272 Additionally, given that the AECA is placed in Title
261. Not to be confused with the African Elephant Conservation Act (also AECA) codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 4223(1) (2006).
262. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
263. Title 22, United States Code.
264. Title 18, United States Code.
265. Tide 21, United States Code (including 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) and 21 U.S.C.
§§ 952, 960 (2006)).
266. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2) (2006).
267. International Traffic in Arms Regulations [hereinafter ITAR], 22 C.F.R.
§§ 120.1-130.17 (2011).
268. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (Supp. 2012).
269. ITAR §§ 120.6, .9-.10, .13-.15, .17, 129.2(b).
270. § 120.12. The State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
administers ITAR. Id.
271. See § 121.1 (known as "The United States Munitions List").
272. United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2M5.2(a)(2) (2011). The Base Of-
fense Level is fourteen if the offense involves "only (A) non-fully automatic small arms (rifles,
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22, line federal prosecutors are generally not informed about these
potential charges. Nor are many ATF agents involved in prosecut-
ing these crimes.
273
AECA and ITAR could be useful for prosecuting firearms traf-
ficking to Mexico, given that they provide criminal penalties for vio-
lating their provisions.2 74 Not using ATF agents for prosecutions of
firearms offenses appears to be slightly limiting, given that the ATF
is the expert agency regarding firearms and firearms trafficking to
Mexico and other countries. The low penalties for non-automatic
firearms trafficking also seem like an impediment toward using
AECA and ITAR for Mexican firearms trafficking. Finally, it is likely
that these charges are viewed in the law enforcement community as
closer to paperwork violations (much like convicting Al Capone for
tax evasion) and are also considered more complicated than other
firearms violations. Indeed, the AECA requires the President to is-
sue the prohibited munitions list through ITAR, and includes regis-
tration and licensing requirements, much of which are controlled
by the State Department.275 While the AECA and ITAR might tech-
nically enable prosecuting firearms trafficking to Mexico, it appears
that the ATF is generally not involved in these cases, and it appears
handguns, or shotguns), and the number of weapons did not exceed two." Id. This does
appear to be a nice increase from a requirement of less than ten firearms, given that in 2008,
the Base Offense Level was fourteen if the offense involved less than ten firearms. United
States v. Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, once the firearms exported exceed
two, the Base Offense Level increases to twenty-six. U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a) (1) (2011).
273. ATF agents are tasked with enforcing federal firearms laws, which fall under Title 18
of the United States Code. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BuREAu oF ALCOHOL, ToBAcco, FIREARMs
AND ExPLOSIVES, FEDERAL FIEARmS RFCGUIATIONS REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2005), available at
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-4.pdf. FBI agents are tasked with
investigating a number of criminal violations but not Title 22. Frequently Asked Questions, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs (last visited Nov. 5, 2012)
("Federal law gives the FBI authority to investigate all federal crime not assigned exclusively
to another federal agency ([Title] 28, Section 533 of the U.S. Code.)"). CBP and ICE agents
appear to be involved in enforcing Title 22 regulations, however, although such violations do
not appear widely prosecuted. See, e.g., Jamie Satterfield, Judge: Man Violated Federal Arms Ex-
port Control Act, Deserves Prison, KoxvuiLL NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.knox
news.com/news/2011/oct/I2/judge-man-violated-federal-arms-export-control/ (stating
that, because of an ICE investigation, a Tennessee man received forty-six months for attempt-
ing to ship body armor to Columbia).
274. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(c) (West 2010) (providing a maximum of twenty years in prison
and a maximum $1,000,000 fine, or both, for a willful violation of § 2778 or any rule or
regulation issued under § 2778 (which includes ITAR)). Interestingly, when Congress imple-
mented the AECA in 1976, the enforcement section called only for a $100,000 fine or a
maximum of two years imprisonment or both. 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-
1144 (1976).
275. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)-(b) (2006).
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that run-of-the-mill southbound firearms trafficking is not generally
considered for prosecution under these statutes. 76
B. Why International, Multilateral Approaches Are Not Enough
The Obama and George W. Bush Administrations initiated sev-
eral "out-of-the-box" operations to aid the Mexican government's
fight against drug cartels. Most recently, Mexican commandos and
police have received support from the United States to stage
"boomerang" drug cartel raids. These "boomerang operations" al-
low Mexican law enforcement authorities to stage their raids from
the U.S. side and helicopter back across the border to raid the car-
tel targets.2 77 As part of these raids, the DEA "provides logistical
support on the American side of the border ... arranging staging
areas and sharing intelligence that helps guide Mexico's decisions
about targets and tactics."27 The United States currently flies Amer-
ican Predator and Global Hawk drones over Mexico to gather infor-
mation and intelligence on drug manufacturing facilities and
highly trafficked smuggling routes.279 The United States also em-
ploys manned flights equipped with electronic eavesdropping
equipment to intercept cellular phone communications across the
border.280 Finally, "the D.E.A. has set up an intelligence outpost-
staffed by Central Intelligence Agency operatives and retired Amer-
ican military personnel-on a Mexican military base."'281
While one might argue that this coordination between the
United States and Mexico should be beneficial,28 2 it comes with
complications. In August, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William J.
276. I recognize that this section could be developed into its own stand-alone article
about the failure of the ATF to use AECA and ITAR to prosecute firearms trafficking. Inter-
agency footprints are likely somewhat to blame for this problem (CBP, ICE, and the State
Department likely all have jurisdiction over investigating violations of these statutes). It is also
likely that ATF agents have never received much (or adequate) training on these statutes.
Finally, the low penalties, particularly for non-automatic weapons, likely limit this statute's
effect on "normal" Mexico-bound firearms trafficking. A very deep analysis of this statute and
its lack of use for "normal" firearms trafficking would be beneficial in this area of the law.
277. Mark Mazzetti & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Role in Mexican Fight: Allows Drug
Raids to Start North of the Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at Al, A3.
278. Id. Of course, the joint operation status begs the question about evidentiary issues
should the raids result in prosecutions on the United States' side.
279. Id, at A3.
280. Id Again, the use of these electronic interceptions in federal (or state) prosecutions
is an open question. It appears, however, that these interceptions are provided to the Mexi-
can authorities rather than used for U.S.-based cartel prosecutions.
281. Id
282. Beittel, supra note 60, at 31, 36 (noting the prospects of increased cooperation be-
tween Mexico and the United States).
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Burns "strongly defended the partnership" currently deployed by
the two governments, although his defense came at a time when
many Mexican citizens had concerns about such a partnershipY
83
But the U.S. government is also now taking great pains to empha-
size that it is not conducting 'joint operations" with the Mexican
government.
284
Interestingly, these operations parallel similar cooperation be-
tween the United States and Mexico during the Clinton Administra-
tion. In the late 1990s, the DEA briefly helped Mexico combat the
Tijuana cartel by arranging for vetted Mexican police to stage their
raid operations out of Camp Pendleton in San Diego.28 5 These raids
ended "in 2000 when cartel leaders struck back by kidnapping, tor-
turing and killing a counternarcotics official in the Mexican attor-
ney general's office, along with two fellow drug agents.
'"2 86
The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL) is primarily engaged in multilateral ap-
proaches to curbing incoming drugs and outgoing firearms to Mex-
ico.287 Generally, INL "oversees funding provided to assist Mexico
in its fight against organized crime under the Merida Initiative.
'" 288
While the Merida Initiative provides funding to "strengthen partner
countries' capacities to combat organized criminal activities that
threaten the security of the region, '" 289 the Initiative does not in-
clude a prosecution strategy. Nor does the Initiative impose any re-
quirements on each country to better prosecute criminal firearms
trafficking. Accordingly, having the State Department coordinate
and control the money doled out through the Merida Initiative pro-
vides incentives for each country to use existing enforcement and
legal frameworks rather than strategize to create more effective
alternatives.
Another wrinkle to the multilateral approach to curbing firearms
trafficking is the perceived lack of initiative on the Mexican side.
290
In 2006, using eTrace2 9 1 for guns recovered in Mexico became a
283. Mazzetti & Thompson, supra note 277, at A3.
284. Id. It appears that the United States government is afraid of Mexico's citizens view-
ing their own government as a puppet of the United States. For this reason, it has character-
ized these operations as other than "joint" operations. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. GAO, supra note 7, at 13.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at vii.
291. eTrace is an "online internal tracing system" used by the ATF, which allows the
agents to initiate a trace to determine the origin of a firearm that has been found at a crime
scene or interdicted in some way. Jot STAFFs, FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at
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cornerstone of Project Gunrunner.2 2 The Inspector General's re-
port covering three years of Project Gunrunner noted that its use
"yielded very limited information of intelligence value" and that the
ATF received trace data for less than a quarter of weapons seized in
Mexico.29 3 The trace requests that Mexico provided to the ATF gen-
erally lacked crucial gun data, despite the fact that the ATF pro-
vided training in firearms identification.2 94 Additionally, the
Inspector General's review "determined that Mexican law
enforcement authorities do not view gun tracing as an important
investigative tool.
'295
There are two likely reasons for this lack of commitment to gun
tracing on the part of the Mexican authorities. First, the ATF trace
requests did not provide other, related investigative material, such
as criminal histories of target subjects. Second, some ATF officials
believed that they did a poorjob of communicating the importance
of gun tracing to their Mexican counterparts. 296 One can under-
stand the lack of initiative in Mexico on gun tracing after the ATF
failed to provide relevant and helpful investigative material related
to the tracing, It is hard to get excited about sharing information
when only one side is actively involved in the sharing. And it ap-
pears that the ATF generally has difficulties with inter-agency coop-
eration and sharing of relevant information.2 97 Reluctance and lack
of enthusiasm on behalf of the Mexican authorities is hardly
surprising in this situation.
Furthermore, a concern about corruption in Mexico significantly
hampers U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat firearms traffick-
ing. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study indicated
16 (detailing eTrace and the Suspect Gun Database, which is a database list of all the guns
purchased that "ATF believes might turn up at crime scenes").
292. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at vi-vii, 73-76.
293. Id. at vii; see also GAO, supra note 7, at 16. The DOJ notes that "most seized guns in
Mexico are not traced .. .because of missing or improperly entered gun data." OrncE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at 73. DOJ faults the Mexico Attorney General's office for the
operation of the gun trace system, noting the barriers to receiving access to the guns for
tracing. Id.
294. OFFIcE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at vii. Interestingly, it appears that success-
ful trace requests have actually declined since Project Gunrunner began. Id. at 75-76.
295. Id. at vii, 78-79.
296. Id.
297. Id. at vi, 68-72 ("We also found that ATF and ICE do not work together effectively
on investigations of firearms trafficking to Mexico.. .. ATF and ICE rarely conduct joint
investigations of firearms trafficking to Mexico, do not consistently notify each other of their
firearms trafficking cases, and do not consistently coordinate their investigative work with
each other."). But ATF does coordinate well with the DEA and CBP in its operations and
investigations. Id. at 67-68.
FALL 2012]
54 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
that "[a] ccording to Mexican government officials, corruption per-
vades all levels of Mexican law enforcement-federal, state, and
local."291 The GAO study discussed several cases involving both fed-
eral and state/local Mexican law enforcement agents engaging in
kidnapping or murder, thereby necessitating the Calder6n Admin-
istration's use of the Mexican military for a number of drug/fire-
arm interdiction operations.2 99  The Calder6n Administration
attempted to enact reforms to root out corruption and better facili-
tate work with the U.S. government.300 Perceived public corruption
in Mexico will always be a problem in coordinating firearms (and
drug) interdiction on both sides of the border, but both U.S. and
Mexican law enforcement personnel have put forth herculean ef-
forts to lessen its impact. Until it is eradicated, however, multilateral
efforts to curb firearms trafficking, such as the Merida Initiative,
will not reach their full potential.
301
Finally, the initial enthusiasm over the Merida Initiative's ability
to spur both interagency and inter-country cooperation has waned
given the more recent agency results. Evidencing that enthusiasm,
Marisa R. Lino, former U.S. Ambassador to Albania and then-Assis-
tant Secretary for International Affairs at the Department of Home-
land Security, stated in 2008 that "[a] perfect example of how
interagency cooperation will support Merida on the U.S. side of the
border is a joint strategy based on broad principles developed by
CBP, ICE, ATF and DEA aimed at identifying and disrupting the
illicit cross-border trafficking of firearms and ammunition."3 2  Ac-
cording to Lino, "ATF, ICE and CBP agree upon broad principles
as part of an interagency strategy to identify, investigate, and inter-
dict the illicit cross-border trafficking of firearms and ammunition
298. GAO, supra note 7, at 50-51.
299. Id. at 51 ("[A] ccording to U.S. and Mexican government officials" the Mexican mili-
tary "is generally considered to be less vulnerable to corruption than law enforcement.").
300. Id. For instance, in 2006, the administration suspended 953 federal employees and
dismissed 945 of the same through investigations into public corruption. Id.
301. There is also an argument that Senate ratification of the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking of Firearms, Explosives, and Other Re-
lated Materials (CIFTA) "would encourage other countries in the Americas to ratify the Con-
vention and make necessary changes in their own laws." See DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHARLES
SCHUMER & SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, HALTING U.S. FIREARMS TRAFFICKING TO MEXICO: A
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 16
(2011), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfrn?Fuseaction=files.View
&FileStoreid=beaff893-63cl-4941-9903-67a0dc739b9d. The United States is already in com-
pliance with CIFTA, which therefore does not facilitate any real changes in U.S. domestic
laws (which are responsible for firearms traveling to Mexico).
302. U.S. Obligations, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Hon. Marisa R. Lino, Assistant
Sec'y, Office of Policy/Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
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into Mexico."30 3 Fast-forwarding to ATF operations in 2010 and
2011 with Operation Fast and Furious, it is clear that ATF did not
coordinate with CBP, ICE, or DEA in those operations.30 4 While
many expected the Merida Initiative to create a culture of exchange
and cooperation to combat firearms trafficking, the facts of the past
four years belie that expectation.
C. Passage of Another Federal Assault Weapons Ban
As noted above,305 the expiration of the FAWB appears to have
affected firearms-related violence in Mexico, at least through
2006.306 The Dube study demonstrated that homicides increased by
40 percent in Mexico border municipalities within one hundred
miles of states that did not have their own state-imposed assault
weapons ban.3 0 7 The data from that study also demonstrated similar
increases in gun-related crimes and prosecution, indicating the
likely efficacy, on some level, of the FAWB. This study therefore
begs the question: why wouldn't imposing a similar ban have the
same effect, lessening drug-related violence in Mexico?
Imposing another FAWB in the current political climate appears
to be a non-starter. Indeed, the NRA and the Republican Party in
general appear to be against further perceived curtailment of gun
rights for citizens.30 At the beginning of the Obama Administra-
tion, Attorney General Eric Holder indicated some support for
303. Id. at 17. Lino notes that "[d]iscussions are ongoing to address more detailed proce-
dures regarding the coordination of multi-agency operations and information sharing." Id.
These discussions did not result in much operational cooperation, at least in Operation Fast
and Furious. OFFICE OF INSPECrOR GEN., supra note 25, at 17, 106-208 (outlining Fast and
Furious in great detail and noting the lack of coordination between agencies).
304. Supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 126-163 and accompanying text.
306. Dube et al., supra note 18, at 26-27; Chicoine, supra note 18, at 22.
307. Dube et al., supra note 18, at 26-27; Chicoine, supra note 18, at 22.
308. See Republican Party, Republican Party Platform, GOPcoM 13 (2012), available at
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012COPPlatform.pdf ("The Second
Amendment: Our Right to Keep and Bear Arms"; calling for the protection of the "God-given
right of self-defense," and the support of federal legislation "that would expand the exercise
of [the individual right of self-defense] by allowing those with state-issued carry permits to
carry firearms in any state that issues such permits to its own residents."). The platform also
condemns the "ill-considered Clinton gun ban" and opposes "the improper collection of
firearms sales information in the four southern border states." Id. See also GOPAdopts Strongly
Pro-Gun Platform, NRA.oRG (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/
2012/gop-adopts-strongly-pro-gun-platform.aspx (supporting Republican Platform and call-
ing it "the most pro-Second Amendment position ever included in a major party platform) (emphasis
in original).
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reinstating the assault weapons ban.30 9 That support was tempered
by other Democratic lawmakers, 310 and efforts to enact another
FAWB have made little headway. 311
Additionally, the Supreme Court recently strengthened the legal
regime surrounding the Second Amendment and the ability of citi-
zens to legally possess firearms. D.C. v. Helleal 2 and McDonald v. City
of Chicago3 13 advanced the rights of citizens to possess weapons.
While neither case completely eviscerates the possibility of a federal
ban on certain types of firearms, neither helps advance gun control.
There does appear to be a silver lining in the Heller opinion that
may provide some hope for a future FAWB. In Heller, the Court
noted an "important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms"
in that "the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use
at the time.'''314 Citing to numerous authorities, the Court sug-
gested that this limitation had fair support in historical tradition.
315
It then remarked that "weapons that are most useful in military ser-
vice-M-16 rifles and the like-may be banned."3 1 6 This demon-
strates that, although the Court willingly recognized the individual
right to bear arms, it also recognized that right within the context
of arms "in common use at the time." This statement is especially
helpful to supporting a FAWB given that the current firearms of
choice among the drug cartels are certain long rifles (and so-called
"cop-killer" handguns). 17 Heller's discussion of the M-16 rifle-a
military style rifle like the AK47 and AR-15 and conclusion that
such a weapon is not a protected weapon "in common use at the
time" of the founding,318 demonstrates that the case could not be
used to oppose a future FAWB.
309. Brent Lang, Holder Revives Talk of an Assault Weapons Ban, CBSNEws (Feb. 26, 2009,
2:28 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4831751-503544.htil.
310. Id. (quoting House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as stating, "[o]n that score, I think we need
to enforce the laws we have right now. I think it's clear the Bush Administration didn't do
that"); Alex Roth, Paulo Prada & Corey Dade, New Calls for Assault-Gun Ban, WALL ST.J., Mar.
13, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123690314709013801.html.
311. There has been at least one recent proposal to enact a FAWB, however. See FEINSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 301, at 4, 13-14.
312. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that D.C.'s statute banning handgun possession in the
home violated the Second Amendment and that the Second Amendment conferred an indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms).
313. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms onto the States).
314. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
315. Id. (citations omitted).
316. Id.
317. See supra note 16. One might argue that Heller might allow for banning "cop-killer"
handguns favored by the cartels, but it is unlikely that other guns preferred by the cartels-
the long guns-would pass muster under such a ban under Heller.
318. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
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While another FAWB might provide some relief to those suffer-
ing from drug violence in Mexico, it would not do enough. A true
firearms trafficking statute would provide the necessary tools for
the ATF and the DOJ to construct actual firearms cases with greater
scope and an international bite. Although a new FAWB might shut
off the spigot of weapons favored by the drug cartels, it would not
eliminate all of those weapons. 319 Failing to include appropriate
prosecutorial tools to combat southbound firearms trafficking
would only signal an interest in eliminating certain weapons, rather
than in curbing all weapons traveling to Mexico. The FAWB dealt
with a subset of weapons that travel to Mexico and wreak havoc in
that country, but passage of a true firearms trafficking statute, possi-
bly in conjunction with a new FAWB, would have a much bigger
effect on prosecutorial activities within the United States.
D. Opposition to a Firearms Trafficking Statute
Both McDonald and Heller point the way for how several gun advo-
cacy groups would level opposition to an actual firearms trafficking
statute. According to McDonald, "[s] elf-defense is a basic right, rec-
ognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present
day, and .. .individual self-defense is 'the central component' of
the Second Amendment right. '" 320 McDonald later notes that "Heller
makes it clear that this right [of self-defense] is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.' "321 Any attack on a firearms traf-
ficking statute will no doubt invoke these statements from McDonald
and Heller to ensure that that the right to bear (powerful and
deadly) firearms is not infringed. Indeed, Glenn Reynolds argues
that Heller and McDonald provide that gun ownership (plus trans-
portation and transfer of guns). are "constitutionally protected
act[s]," and therefore laws restricting gun rights will be "ripe for
close judicial scrutiny."
322
Yet McDonald and Heller both answer this likely attack in a rela-
tively straightforward manner. The McDonald Court notes that it
319. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. While semi-automatic rifles such as the AK-
47 and the AR-1 5 would likely be subject to the FAWB, the other firearms favored by the drug
cartels include semiautomatic pistols such as the .38 Super, 9 mm, .45, and the 5.7 min.,
which would not be subject to a new FAWB.
320. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citing and quoting He1er,
554 U.S. at 599).
321. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
322. Reynolds, supra note 238, at 254.
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"made it clear in Heller that our holding [striking down D.C.'s hand-
gun ban] did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory
measures as [felon in possession statutes] . . . 'or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.' "
32 3
The Heller Court also cites other helpful commentators who opined
that certain limits exist on the rights encompassed by the Second
Amendment: "From Blackstone through the 19th century cases,
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not
a right to keep and carry a weapon whatsoever in any manner what-
soever and for whatever purpose.
'3 24
Additionally, other Court precedents lend credence to argu-
ments in favor of the constitutionality of a firearms trafficking stat-
ute.325 While possessing legal firearms for use and protection within
the confines of the United States appears appropriate under Heller
and McDonald, trafficking in firearms to other countries, especially
countries that ban individual possession of firearms, would not be
"bearing arms for a lawful purpose 3 26 Prohibiting trafficking in
firearms that may be lawfully possessed in the United States, but are
sent to Mexico or another country without appropriate export doc-
uments, does not infringe on a person's right to bear arms. While
this right extends to the fifty states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the right to dispose of those firearms in an extraterritorial
manner would not be a lawful purpose, at least according to United
States v. Cruikshank.3 27 Accordingly, arguments proffered by the
NRA or other gun-rights organizations immediately lose their ap-
peal insofar as they advocate an unfettered right to dispose of law-
fully purchased domestic weapons transnationally in contravention
of another country's firearms laws.
While some might argue that the gun lobby arguments have va-
lidity in the context of non-legal trafficking exports, this argument
fails. Notwithstanding Heller and McDonald, no one has identified a
right to export guns outside the commercial arena, nor has anyone
identified a right to provide weapons so that violence can occur in
another country. Indeed, an interesting question regarding current
firearms trafficking is whether Mexico can sue the United States for
323. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 626-27 (2008)). The
list submitted by the Court in Heller is not meant to be exhaustive, thereby allowing for at
least the discussion about a true firearms trafficking statute. Heler, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
324. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted).
325. Even the McDonald Court responded to the municipalities' doomsday scenario of
lacking regulations on firearms by noting that incorporating the Second Amendment onto
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment "does not imperil every law regulating fire-
arms." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
326. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
327. Id.
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allowing easily trafficked firearms into its country. For the gun
lobby, it is easy to argue for unfettered gun rights within this coun-
try, but these arguments are unpersuasive when deployed to sup-
port an alleged right to dispose of such legally obtained weapons
extraterritorially. Any firearms trafficking statute that actually
criminalizes true extraterritorial trafficking would not impinge on
the legal rights of gun owners within the United States.
E. Congressional Chutzpah3
28
In 2009, in response to heightened violence in Mexico and com-
plaints of a lack of data on firearms trafficking to Mexico, members
of Congress asked the GAO to conduct a study on the issue.32 9 The
report enumerated several challenges faced by U.S. law enforce-
ment in its efforts to stem illicit sales and transfers of firearms to
Mexico. It noted that "certain provisions of some federal firearms
laws present challenges to U.S. efforts according to ATF officials" ' 330
Unfortunately, the provisions it identified included only such mea-
sures as restrictions on collection and reporting of firearms
purchases, the lack of background checks on private sales, and lim-
its on multiple gun purchasing reporting requirements.-3 1 The
report discussed corruption issues and the lack of a "bilateral, mul-
tiagency arms trafficking task force."33 2 But the GAO report did not
discuss the lack of a firearms trafficking statute-the glaring imped-
iment to interdicting cross-border firearms trafficking.
Since the news broke on Operation Fast and Furious, Congress
has conducted numerous hearings and issued several reports relat-
ing to the ATF's and the DOJ's activities 33 Congressional uproar,
328. A recent commentator noted "[i]rony abounds when it comes to the Fast and
Furious scandal. But the ultimate irony is this: Republicans who support the National Rifle
Association and its attempts to weaken gun laws are lambasting ATF agents for not seizing
enough weapons-ones that, in this case, prosecutors deemed to be legal." Eban, supra note
23.
329. GAO, supra note 7, at 3.
330. Id.
331. Id. It also noted concerns with a lack of coordination between the ATF and ICE and
a failure of analysis and reporting of relevant data. Id.
332. Id. at 4.
333. For instance, Attorney General Eric Holder has testified on Fast and Furious nine
times, including before both the Judiciary Committee and Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform (Issa Committee). David A. Graham, Eric Holder, Contempt of Congress, and
Fast and Furious: What You Need to Know, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2012), http://
www. theatlanticcom/poli tics/archive/201 2/06/eric-holder-contempt-of-congress-and-fast-
and-furious-what-you-need-to-know/258783/#. The Issa Committee has issued several reports
on their findings. SeeJoINr STAFFS, ACCOUNTS OF ATF AGENTS, supra note 23; JoINT STAFss,
FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE, supra note 23; MINORITY STAFF, FATALLY FLAWED, supra note 21.
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especially on the Republican side, is quite high, and there are nu-
merous calls for Attorney General Eric Holder to resign (along with
a contempt vote against him) .34 While the DOJ surely handled the
initial requests for evidence poorly, there is no evidence demon-
strating that ATF agents coordinated "gunwalking" with the DOJ in
any consistent manner. Instead, it appears the operation suffered
from poor oversight.
What is telling, however, is that the misguided gunwalking effort
has not spurred a clarion call for revamping the federal firearms
trafficking statute in order to more effectively combat guns travel-
ing to Mexico and curb existing drug violence. Instead of viewing
this as an opportunity to provide law enforcement with better tools
to fight firearms trafficking, many members of Congress complain
about the ATF's gunwalking tactics and call for resignations. Nu-
merous news outlets and commentators have gone as far as to claim
that the Obama Administration instituted the gunwalking opera-
tions in order to alter federal firearms policy once those tactics
backfired.
35
Yet the incredulity of numerous members of Congress at Opera-
tion Fast and Furious fails to illuminate the real issue: Congress has
consistently hamstrung ATF efforts by allowing for lax gun regula-
tion laws and reporting requirements, and providing no effective
firearms trafficking statute. 3 6 The shock over the ATF's actions in
Fast and Furious has done nothing to solve the current problem,
which is that the ATF and DOJ do not have the prosecutorial tools
to actually charge offenders with firearms trafficking. Congress has
been aware of the issues facing the ATF for some time, at least since
The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform also maintains a website devoted to
its investigation of Operation Fast and Furious, at http://issues.oversight.house.gov/fas-
tandfurious/ (it appears to be maintained by the majority, specifically Darrell Issa's staff).
334. Ed O'Keefe & Sari Horwitz, House Votes to Hold Attorney General Eric Holder in Contempt,
WASH. POST June 28, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fast-and-furious-house-
plans-vote-on-holding-eric-holder-in-contempt/2012/06/28/gQAznG9V story.html?hpid=
Z3; Alan Silverleib, House Holds Holder in Contempt, CNN.coM (June 28, 2012), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/holder-contempt/index.html; Eban, supra note 23
("Conservatives have pummeled the Obama administration, and especially Holder, for more
than a year. .. . On June 20, in a day of political brinkmanship, Issa's committee voted along
party lines, 23 to 17, to hold Holder in contempt of Congress for allegedly failing to turn over
certain subpoenaed documents, which the Justice Department contended could not be re-
leased because they related to ongoing criminal investigations.").
335. Sharyl Attkisson, Documents: A 7T Used 'Fast and Furious'to Make the Case for Gun Regula-
tions, CBSNEws (Dec. 7, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-5733854
6-10391695/documents-atf-used-fast-and-furious-to-make-the-case-for-gun-regulations/. Sena-
tor Charles Grassley subscribed to this specific view: "There's plenty of evidence showing that
this administration planned to use the tragedies of Fast and Furious as rationale to further
their goals of a long gun reporting requirement." Id.
336. See supra notes 308-311 and accompanying text.
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DOJ's Project Gunrunner Report submitted in November 2010.
That report, which has been discussed in Fast and Furious congres-
sional hearings, specially notes that "statutes used to combat fire-
arms trafficking do not have strong penalties" and that current U.S.
law lacks a firearms trafficking statute. 3 7 Indeed, Congress has been
aware that, without a specific federal firearms trafficking statute,
the "ATF uses a wide variety of statutes to address criminal firearms
trafficking" and that these statutes "carry relatively low penalties."338
Congress's actions attacking the ATF seem to be the very definition
of chutzpah, because Congress complained about violence in Mex-
ico, failed to provide the ATF and the DOJ with an appropriate stat-
ute to combat the problem, and then opened congressional
hearings regarding the ATF's subsequent poor tactical decisions.
While it is clear that the ATF acted inappropriately in Fast and Furi-
ous, the general tenor of Congress has not risen to the occasion
and provided the ATF and the DOJ with the necessary prosecutorial
tools to stem firearms trafficking and, indirectly, the resulting drug
violence in Mexico.
V. ANALYZING DOMESTIC CRIMINAli LAWS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
EFFECTS: PRIORITIZING EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS FOR
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
Generally, the extraterritorial effects of domestic laws are not the
primary concern, nor the primary driver, of congressional legisla-
tion and domestic criminal statutes. In areas of national security or
trade, Congress does take these effects into account, but domestic
criminal legislation is not an arena where such effects are touted,
much less discussed. In two areas, however, such effects are consid-
ered. Firearms trafficking should be the third such area.
A. Firearms Trafficking
The legislative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968 indicates
concern about federal regulation of interstate firearms traffic.339
For instance, the General Statement on the legislation notes that
the "subject legislation responds to widespread national concern
that existing Federal control over the sale and shipment of firearms
337. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 19, at 58-59.
338. Id. at 59-60.
339. H.R. REp. No. 90-1577, at 3 (1968).
FALL 2012]
62 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
[across] State lines is grossly inadequate. '" 340 On the issue of "long
gun" regulation, the report notes that this legislation "is designed
effectively to control the indiscriminate flow of such weapons across
State borders and to assist and encourage States and local commu-
nities to adopt and enforce strict gun control laws."3 4 1 Furthermore,
the legislative history evidences a concern about the importation of
firearms but does not indicate any concern about the export of fire-
arms (especially long guns and rifles) .342 And a close reading of the
entire legislation reveals no mention of exports of firearms or ex-
porters of firearms.
Thus, the Gun Control Act of 1968 demonstrates no congres-
sional intent to regulate exports of firearms or any international
outgoing firearms trafficking activity. While one might argue that
Congress passed the AECA with the intent to regulate international
firearms trafficking, the section above demonstrates Congress' in-
tent to actually regulate international commercial transactions in-
volving firearms, with an eye toward "unemployment," "foreign
policy," and "trade."3 43 These are not the buzzwords associated with
curbing drug violence in a foreign country, and especially not the
nomenclature associated with suppressing violence by DTOs that
use American-made or American-imported weapons.
B. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act specifically targets bribery of
foreign officials and criminalizes conduct by multinational corpora-
tions that occurs outside the United States for the benefit of a cor-
poration doing business within the United States .3 4 This statute is
entirely separate from domestic anti-bribery lawsf 45 The legislative
history for the FCPA makes clear that corrupt foreign payments by
U.S. companies severely impact the "image of American democracy
340. Id. The use of the capitalized "State" rather than lowercase "state" indicates a con-
cern about guns crossing local state lines rather than nation-state lines.
341. Id. Again, the use of "across State borders" indicates a desire to control state-state
crossing of firearms rather than nation-state to nation-state crossing of firearms.
342. Id. ("It has also been urged that the import restrictions of existing law... should be
relaxed ... The main purpose of the import restrictions is to arrest the present flood of
imports of surplus military weapons... since these types of important weapons have caused
major law enforcement problems.").
343. Pub. L. No. 94-329 § 218, 90 Stat. 729 (1976).
344. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (a) (1) (2006).
345. The domestic anti-bribery statute is 18 U.S.C. § 201, whereas 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
deals with payments, gifts, promises to "foreign officials." Id.
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abroad," hamper efficiency in capital markets, and impair confi-
dence in corporate financial integrity.3 46 Congress acknowledged
that the widespread paying of foreign bribes by some U.S. firms tar-
nished the reputation and image of U.S. corporations, requiring a
strong anti-bribery law to "bring these corrupt practices to a halt
and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American
business system."
3 47
The legislative history of the FCPA indicates that its primary in-
terest is to encourage appropriate behavior by U.S. companies,
rather than ensuring that historically corrupt countries alter illegal
or unethical practices. But the legislative history does not indicate
that changing the way that U.S. corporations do business outside of
the United States will lead to reform throughout the world econ-
omy or in specific countries; it merely notes that the FCPA will re-
store international confidence in U.S. corporations and boost
American democracy's image abroad. 348 Therefore, the positive ex-
traterritorial effects appear to be a happy coincidence rather than
an intentional effect.
C. The Arms Export Control Act
The legislative history of the AECA and the implementing ITAR
is relatively scant. Congress passed the AECA as an amendment of
the Foreign Military Sale Act, rather than as a completely new act
and implementing statute. 349 For arms trafficking, the bill sought to
"restructure U.S. arms sales policies to provide for increased con-
gressional supervision," including placing a cap on defense articles
and defense services sales by the U.S. government or commercial
entities.150 The legislative history further examined the relevant dis-
cussion relating to why, how, and when certain arms transfers
should be approved.351 Indeed, passage of the AECA appears to
346. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3-4 (1977).
347. Id. at 4.
348. 1d.
349. H.R. REP. No. 94-1144 (1976).
350. Id. at 8-9. In 1976, the cap was $9 billion. Id. That cap does not appear to be in
place after 1986. See Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-247, 100 Stat. 9 (1986); see also GAO, GAO-05-234, DEFENSE
TRADE: ARMS EXPORT ENFORCEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT 20
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05234.pdf (noting an increase of arms
export license cases (not criminally prosecuted cases) increasing from approximately forty-
three thousand in 1999 to fifty-four thousand in 2003),
351. H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, at 12-13 (1976). These considerations include, "What is the
U.S. interest in helping to preserve that security? ... And what are the consequences for us if
we fail to respond?" Id.
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have depended on "the importance which arms transfers have for
our own national security" rather than concern for the instability
that rogue transfers of arms may produce in a foreign country.
352
The bill included other provisions not specifically relevant to the
AECA but relevant to the climate of its passage. Namely, Congress
enacted U.S. policy "that no security assistance should be furnished
to any foreign country if the laws, regulations, official policies or
governmental practices of such country discriminate against any
U.S. citizen and prevent". "furnishing or sale of... defense articles
and defense services. '" 353 The House report noted that this was "a
reform measure" and remarked on the vast amount of security assis-
tance the measure provided to friendly foreign countries to "pro-
vide for collective security" and help such countries maintain their
own internal security.354 Relating to commercial sales, the report
noted that "[t] he sale of defense articles through commercial chan-
nels is increasing each year. If the United States is to develop a ra-
tional arms sales policy, it is essential that the totality of U.S. arms
exports be considered. '" 355
By looking at the AECA in totality, Congress' intent appears to be
to create a regime that allows for commercial imports and exports
of defense articles and is subject to the control of the Executive
branch.356 The AECA's requirement that the Secretary of State com-
pile a report documenting the Act's effect on "unemployment in
the United States," the "foreign policy of the United States," and
"trade with foreign countries" demonstrates the commercial reali-
ties of the AECA. 57 Tellingly, there is no companion provision re-
quiring the Secretary of State or Attorney General to examine the
effect of the AECA on violence in foreign countries.
352. Id. at 13.
353. Id. at 9.
354. Id. at 10.
355. Id. at 7. Interestingly, there is no mention of illegal arms trafficking mentioned in
the legislative history; the bill is aimed at commercial traffickers.
356. The Act itself reveals this contention. The 1976 version of the Act indicates that the
"Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a comprehen-
sive study of the effects of the enactment of [the AECA] with a view to determining the
consequences of such provisions on (1) the foreign policy of the United States, (2) the bal-
ance of payments of the United States, (3) the trade with foreign countries, (4)
unemployment in the United States, and (5) weapons procurement by the Department of
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D. Using Extraterritorial Effects As a Trigger for Legislation
As the legislative history discussed above demonstrates, the extra-
territorial effects of domestic criminal statutes are generally not the
driving force for their passage. Understandably, the passage of most
domestic criminal statutes is not driven by its possible effect outside
of the United States. With firearms trafficking, this should be a driv-
ing force, particularly given the shocking death toll that continues
only a few miles south of the border. While the affect on domestic
firearms regulations would likely be negligible (except on those
trafficking firearms extraterritorially), the affect on the Republic of
Mexico would be much larger. Providing the tools that the ATF and
the DOJ desperately need to prosecute "real" firearms trafficking is
paramount at this critical juncture.35 And passage of a true fire-
arms trafficking statute that criminalizes the actual trafficking 359
would allow the ATF and the DOJ to build and prosecute those
cases that would curb violence in Mexico.
This then begs the question: When the effects in the United
States are relatively negligible, but the effects extraterritorially are
great, should the latter effects be a consideration in determining
whether to pass a statute? And if these effects do amount to a con-
sideration for passage, how much weight should they be given? At
least in the context of firearms trafficking, the extraterritorial effect
of a more robust firearms trafficking statute should be given great
weight to counter the arguments made by the gun lobby. There are
several reasons for this. First, if more robust domestic criminal laws
can provide relief for countries like Mexico that are devastated by
violence, then the United States has a duty to at least examine and
seriously consider those alternative laws. Second, if the United
States takes its role in the Mexican drug violence seriously, then it
should desire to act and not just throw money at the problem.
Third, the concern about spillover violence-a hybrid domestic
and extraterritorial effect of the drug violence-mandates that
both the internal and external effects of these laws be considered.
Fourth, if a deterrent statute led to less firearms trafficking to Mex-
ico, then the United States could claim a victory on the war against
drug violence without devoting massive resources to the problem.
Finally, passage of a more robust firearms trafficking statute would
likely alleviate the problems stemming from Operation Fast and
Furious.
358. See supra notes 244-276 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 236-276 and accompanying text.
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Passing a true firearms trafficking statute would nevertheless be
subject to extensive opposition from the gun lobby,3 60 but the extra-
territorial effect argument should be enough to counter this lobby's
claims. If the United States is serious about trying to curb drug vio-
lence in Mexico, merely providing monetary and tactical support
will not equip law enforcement and prosecutors with enough tools
to combat the problem in the United States. Providing better
prosecutorial tools will demonstrate U.S. commitment to solving
the problem. It will also actually result in prosecutions that one
hopes will send a deterrent message to others engaged in firearms
trafficking. Both these domestic and extraterritorial effects are im-
portant to rebutting anti-gun control arguments, and, on this spe-
cific issue, they should trump the dialogue to affect passage of a
true extraterritorial firearms trafficking statute.
CONCLUSION
Mexico and the United States share a common concern: curbing
the massive drug violence and killings in Mexico carried out in
large part by the Mexican drug cartels. This is a human rights issue
ripe for U.S. involvement, and drug violence spillover in the United
States is a real and valid fear. Such spillover violence has already
occurred in the U.S., though not yet on significant levels. Accord-
ingly, if the United States is serious about cutting off the deadly
spigot of firearms trafficked south to Mexico, it must implement a
robust firearms trafficking statute that the ATF and the DOJ can use
effectively. Some would argue against this point on the basis that
the extraterritorial effects of domestic criminal laws should not be a
primary concern. In this case, the positive extraterritorial effects
should be the primary reason for passing a more efficacious fire-
arms trafficking statute.
Generally, the most important consideration for a domestic crim-
inal law is its effect on domestic crime. The exogenous effects of a
criminal law are not usually considered, nor do these effects exhibit
a rallying cry for the creation of domestic laws that have considera-
ble effects internationally. Indeed, Congress and the courts have
focused on the use of international law in the interpretation of do-
mestic laws, rather than the effects of domestic laws on other coun-
tries. This Article argues the value of the former-that the United
States should consider passage of domestic criminal laws that cause
beneficial effects on other countries. Specifically, the passage of a
360. See supra notes 320-327 and accompanying text.
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true firearms trafficking statute, along with heightened penalties
for gun trafficking and an assault weapons ban, would alleviate the
murderous violence undertaken by drug cartels in Mexico.
The model firearms trafficking statute outlined in this Article
would alleviate some of the problems faced by law enforcement and
prosecutors and could stem the flow of firearms southbound to
Mexico. While the lobbying efforts of the NRA and other organiza-
tions and lawmakers might make passing and implementing this
statute difficult, a statutorily oriented approach would provide the
ATF and the DOJ the tools to target firearms traffickers in a more
efficient and straightforward manner. These statutes may also allevi-
ate the ATF's (and the DOJ's) need to invent creative operations to
target weapons trafficking, thereby avoiding potentially destructive
practices such as "gunwalking" to Mexico.
In sum, if the United States is serious about providing tools to
stem drug violence in Mexico, throwing money at the problem
through the Merida Initiative, or even "coordinating" law enforce-
ment efforts, is not enough. Passing a robust firearms trafficking
statute that provides positive extraterritorial effects is necessary for
stopping Mexican drug violence, regardless of the very vocal oppo-
sition that will likely result from such a statute. In the realm of drug
violence, this is an area of the law for which the extraterritorial ef-
fects of such a domestic criminal statute should trump the
legislative concerns, the gun lobby's concerns, and the conservative
caucus' concerns over the passage of such a statute.
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